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PREFACE
Although it is considered by many to be one of the greatest documents ever
written in history, the United States Constitution failed to address one of the most
obvious and important issues facing the newly formed government: the legal status
of the various Indian tribes. Because of this oversight, tribal, state and federal
governments have been engaged in a tug of war for control over the land and
resources in this country for over 200 years. The Native Peoples have struggled
during this time to maintain their sovereignty as distinct social and political units,
while states have pressured the federal government to take land and resources from
the tribes. These tensions exist today as much as they did two centuries ago.
But time has not stood still for the tribes. During the last 200 years, tribal
justice systems have evolved from their pre-contact form to hybrid combinations
of traditional Indian systems and modem American courts. While many see this as
a change for the worse, state and federal courts have made it clear that they will not
honor the decisions of tribal justice systems unless they can recognize and
understand them, at least at some level. And although the tribal dispute resolution
systems are not wholly traditional, they are still uniquely Indian. So, despite any
hope that the tribes would assimilate and thus make the "problem" go away, the
states and the federal government can no longer pretend that the tribes do not exist.
There is a third judicial system: the tribal courts.
Because the tribal, federal and state systems exist in a world of mass
communication and transportation, the number of controversies and crimes that
cross borders will only increase. Therefore, the smooth operation of each of these
sovereigns depends on cooperation among all of them. This Article first outlines the
history and evolution of the tensions that have developed and then attempts to
provide solutions that will address the needs and goals of the tribes, the states and
the federal government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the most part, determining the jurisdiction of a state court is a
straightforward matter. If the parties to the dispute live, drive, work or otherwise
conduct business in the state, any crimes, accidents or disputes that occur in the
state relating to that conduct are within the jurisdiction of its police to enforce and
its courts to adjudicate. But when those same crimes, accidents or disputes occur
in Indian country, the question of jurisdiction becomes a complex inquiry. Instead
of using the geographical boundaries of the reservation or other Indian lands as the
starting point, the determination of a tribe's jurisdiction involves such questions as
whether the parties are Indian or non-Indian,' tribal members or nonmember
Indians; 2 whether the incident occurred in Indian country3 on fee or trust land;4
whether the crime is a "major crime"; 5 and whether the tribe is subject to federal
legislation limiting the tribes' jurisdiction.6 The resolution of the tribal jurisdiction
question is further complicated by inconsistent federal Indian policy as reflected in
both legislation and contradictory case law.
I1. HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
A. Source of Federal Power over Indian Affairs
Congressional power over Indians is often described as "plenary," the literal
meaning of which is "absolute" or "total." 7 Congress has this special authority over
Indian affairs pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which
allows the national legislature "[to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' Today, the Indian
Commerce Clause, along with the power to make treaties, is seen as the principal
1. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999) (giving the federal government
jurisdiction over several "major" crimes committed by Indians in Indian country); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians).
2. See infra Part VI (explaining case precedentrelating to criminal jurisdiction); Part IX.A.1-2 (discussing
the unresolved issues regarding the distinctions between jurisdiction over tribal members and nonmember Indians
in the civil context).
3. See General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West 1984) (providing a definition of"Indian country");
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999) (same). These statutes are discussed infra at Part V.C
and V.E respectively.
4. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997) (setting out the test for civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on fee land within the boundaries of the reservation); see also infra Part IX.B (discussing Strate).
5. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153. See infra Part V.E (discussing the Major Crimes Act).
6. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1162 (West 1984), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993)).
See generally infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (specifying the provisions of Public Law 83-280).
7. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,384 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,56 (1978).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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basis for broad federal power over Indians.9 The concept of Congress' plenary
power over Indian affairs is a basic premise of Indian law and policy.
B. Federal Preemption Doctrine
Under the federal preemption doctrine,'" federal law may supersede state law
in two situations. The first is when Congress intends to legislate exclusively in an
area of law, thus occupying the entire field."' The second situation arises when
enforcing the state law would frustrate the purpose behind the federal legislation.1
2
With respect to Indian law, because Congress has plenary power over Indian
affairs, 13 Congress has clearly indicated an intent to occupy the field. Thus, any
state legislation that purports to cover Indian affairs will likely be preempted by the
federal scheme. 4
C. Tribal Sovereignty
Historically, the European nations and the United States federal government
recognized the sovereign status of Indian tribes. First, the European governments
used this status as the basis of making treaties with the tribes, which were treated
as independent nations. Then, after the Revolutionary War, the newly created
federal government continued to make treaties with the tribes. But it was not long
after the federal government was established that tribal sovereignty began to be
eroded. The Supreme Court took the first step in diminishing tribal sovereignty in
Johnson v. M'Intosh.'5 In this case, the Court held that America had been
"discovered" and the tribes "conquered," leaving Indians with the right to occupy
but not possess the land. 6 Next, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,7 the Supreme
Court held that the tribes were neither states nor foreign nations, but rather were
"domestic dependent nations."' 8 In spite of these rulings, the Court consistently
acknowledged the tribes' inherent sovereignty. In Worcester v. Georgia,19 the Court
9. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 211 (1982).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1824).
11. Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493,509 (1989).
12. Id
13. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 379-80 (1896); COHEN, supra note 9, at 207.
14. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (noting that federal
preemption is one of"two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal
reservations or members"). Most of the difficult issues of federal preemption with respect to Indian affairs arise
when a state enacts a law that is not directed at the tribe, such as an environmental law, but that impact on tribal
sovereignty if that law is enforced in Indian country.
15. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
16. Id. at 594.
17. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
18. Id. at 17.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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stated that the "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent,
political communities, retaining their original natural rights"20 and that the use of
the word "nations" in the Constitution with reference to the tribes confirmed their
status as separate sovereigns.2 The Court held that, because tribes were separate
sovereigns, state laws could not be enforced within reservation boundaries.Y Later,
in Talton v. Mayes, 3 the Court confirmed that the tribes' sovereign powers pre-
dated the Constitution. 2
In addition to the broad inherent sovereignty rights retained by the tribes, more
specific rights can be set out in treaties or statutes. For example, a treaty might
specify that tribal members have rights to hunt or fish in certain off-reservation
areas, and the tribe may enforce its laws with respect to tribal members when they
are engaged in those off-reservation activities. The treaty might also specify that the
state's laws cannotbe enforced against the tribal members in that situation. Another
example of such treaties or laws is the Indian Child Welfare Act,25 which
specifically grants tribes exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters when Indian
children live on the reservation.'
But Congress and the federal courts have placed severe restraints upon the
criminal jurisdiction of tribal governments over the past two hundred years. Federal
statutes have limited the types of crimes over which the tribes may assert or
exercise criminal jurisdiction.27 At the same time, the United States Supreme Court
has limited the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts to matters involving tribal
members.2 Although Congress affirmed inherent tribal sovereignty over criminal
matters involving nonmember Indians,29 there has been at least one challenge in a
lower court to the constitutionality of such congressional actions.30
In contrast, the civil jurisdiction of tribes has been comparatively free from
federal intrusions. Tribal governments have traditionally exercised extensive
authority over civil disputes that occur on-reservation. But, over the past two
20. l. at 559.
21. 1L at 559-60.
22. ld. at 595.
23. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
24. id. at 383.
25. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911 (West 1983).
26. Rd. § 1911(a).
27. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West 1984) (applying the general laws of the United States to Indian country);
id. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring exclusive federal jurisdiction over "major crimes" including murder,
rape, kidnaping, etc.)
28. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
29. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1303 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
30. United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1999).
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decades, several Supreme Court decisions have severely limited the tribes' ability
to exercise full civil jurisdiction.3
D. Trust Relationship
A special relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes exists
as a result of the unique legal status of the tribes. Although they are neither states
nor foreign countries, the tribes have elements of both.32 Because the Constitution
never defined the legal status of the tribes, Congress and the Supreme Court have
been left to do so. In one of its earliest decisions involving Indian affairs, the Court
held that the federal government has a duty to protect the interests of the tribes.33
This duty, initially described as resembling the relationship of a guardian to a
ward,34 has become known as the "trust relationship" between the federal
government and the Indian tribes. Pursuant to this responsibility, the federal
government owes a fiduciary duty to the tribes to protect their interests. 35
E. Prior to 1871: Acknowledgment of Traditional Modes of Justice
Prior to 1871, the federal government did not interfere with the traditional
modes of justice administered by Indian tribes. During this era, the power of tribes
to employ their own systems of justice was recognized in treaty documents or in the
treaty-making process.3 6 Because the relationship was essentially government-to-
government, the United States made no judgments upon the justice systems of the
Indian tribes in governing the conduct of tribal members. Most tribes used
banishment, community scorn, and/or restitution as methods for controlling
behavior, including internal tribal enforcement groups.37
31. See, e.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195 (ruling that the tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
for any acts committed by non-Indians in Indian country). The Supreme Court used the reasoning in Oliphant,
which was based on the conclusion that tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, to justify
its recent holding in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), in which it held that the tribes lacked civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over an on-reservation accident between two non-Indians. See also Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (stating that the tribe could
not zone "open" land owned by a nonmember in fee within the reservation boundaries); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981) (holding that the tribe lacked civil jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by
nonmemb.-rs on fee land within the reservation boundaries).
32. For example, like states, tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, and like foreign nations, tribes
have inherent sovereignty to govern their internal affairs--but unlike either states or foreign countries, tribes do
not have jurisdiction based on the outer boundaries of their territories.
33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831).
34. Id
35. COHEN. supra note 9, at 207.
36. A,4ERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 1 (Carrie Small
ed., 1980) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY].
37. Id
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F 1871-1934: Weakening of Tribal Judiciaries
The customary and traditional laws of Indian tribes began to erode after 187 1.3
The reservation system was controlled first by the military and then by civilian
federal agents. These "Indian agents" developed the "Indian police" to maintain law
and order on reservations.39 By the 1880's, some agents had begun to use Indians
as judges in cases which violated the regulations enacted by the agents. These
Indian judges had the confidence of the agents but often lacked the confidence of
their people.4
In 1883, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the establishment of the Courts
of Indian Offenses. 4! Although very meager, this authorization provided funding for
the Indian judges already at work and increased funding for Indian police. The
judges in the Courts of Indian Offenses were under the practical control of the
Indian agents.42 These courts operated under an 1884 law and order code which
contained minimal procedures for processing civil disputes. 43 The code provided for
the use of state laws in resolving civil disputes and limited jurisdiction to Indian
litigants."
In the late 1800's, congressional policy focused largely upon the assimilation
of Indian people into American society. In 1887, Congress passed into law the
General Allotment Act,4 which sought to promote individual ownership of land
among Indians and dissolve communal landholdings. By dividing the tribal lands
into 160-acre parcels, the practical effect, and the underlying intent of the Act, was
to create a huge "surplus" of Indian lands. The "surplus" lands were then opened
up to non-Indian settlement.46 Under the statute, the trust relationship between
individual Indian landowners expired after twenty-five years, at which time they
became subject to state regulation.4 7 Conservative estimates indicate that the
General Allotment Act caused a loss of some 90 million acres of Indian lands.' In
38. Note that in the case of Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the inherent sovereignty of the tribes and their criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. However,
Congress significantly curtailed that holding by enacting the Major Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp.
1999), which took away tribal criminal jurisdiction over several "major" crimes such as murder and rape. Id.
39. VINEDELORiA, JR. & CulORD M. LYTLE AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 114 (1983).
40. Id at 114-15.
41. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100-11.1115 (1999); DELORIA &LYTL . supra note 39, at 115. These courts are also
known as "C.F.R. courts" because they are governed by the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
42. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES, THE BASic ACLU GuIDEoo INDIAN AND
TRIBAL RIGHTs 97 (2d ed. 1992).
43. U
44. L
45. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-358 (,Vest 1983 & Supp. 2000). This Act is also known as the Dawes Act.
46. PEVAR, supra note 42, at 5.
47. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-358 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
48. PEVAR, supra note 42, at 5-6.
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addition, the establishment of the Courts of Indian Offenses eliminated traditional
methods of justice and initiated the intrusion of state law into tribal conflicts.
G. 1934-1953: The Establishment of Courts Under Tribal Authority
For approximately fifty years, the federal government failed to address the
decaying conditions in Indian country. Huge land losses occurred. The health of
Indian people had deteriorated to a deplorable state, and the tribal governments
were without practical authority.49 In 1928, the Meriam Report 00 revealed these dire
conditions of Indian country; the American public was alarmed, and an embarrassed
Congress took action to revitalize Indian country.5'
In 1934, Congress passed into law the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),5 2
which halted the allotment of Indian land and permitted tribes to adopt written
constitutions and codes.53 A model constitution, prepared by the Department of
Interior and adopted by most tribes, provided for the creation of tribal courts to
replace the Courts of Indian Offenses.' Under a model code, also adopted by most
tribes to govern their new tribal courts, Indian judges continued to be appointed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) if paid with federal funds.
The model codes and constitutions adopted by IRA tribes allowed the
Department of the Interior to exert substantial influence over the development of
Indian judiciaries.5 6 Most critical were limitations imposed on the scope of tribal
jurisdiction. For example, in the civil area, the model code restricted jurisdiction to
suits where the defendant was a member of the tribe, or suits between members and
nonmembers brought by the stipulation of both parties.57 Thus, non-tribal members
were subject to tribal jurisdiction only where they consented to such authority,
regardless of the type or situs of the offense. Although these model constitutions
and codes continue to be used by some tribes, many tribes have developed their
own law and order codes and rules of court.
Missing in the IRA constitutions were three key concepts from the Anglo
justice systems. Neither separation of powers, separation of church and state, nor
the power of judicial review were included.58 These missing ingredients have
49. COHEN, supra note 9, at 144.
50. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (L Meriam ed.,
John Hopkins Press 1928). This private Report, commissioned by Congress, is commonly referred to as the
"Meriam Report."
51. DELORIA &LYTLE, supra note 39, at 12-13.
52. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-479 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
53. Id. § 476 (West Supp. 2000).
54. JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 36, at 2-3.
55. Id at 3.
56. Il at 45.
.57. 25 C.F.R. § 11.103(a) (1999).
58. JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 36, at 45.
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caused concern for the state and federal judiciaries and have been detrimental to the
interface between tribal, state and federal courts. The non-tribal courts view tribal
courts as less legitimate because tribal courts are based on different values and
assumptions. On the other hand, the inclusion of these elements into tribal justice
systems tends to undermine what is left of the traditional systems, which were
based on notions of making the community whole, as opposed to the adversarial
system of the Anglo courts.
H. 1953-1968: The Termination Era
In the early 1950's, Congress again turned to a policy of assimilation and the
dismantling of tribal governments.59 The government terminated federal benefits
for many tribes and dissolved several reservations. But certainly the most
devastating actions of Congress involved the termination of the tribes as legal and
political entities.6 Without such legal status, tribal members lost their ability to
exist as distinct sovereign people. The terminated tribes were forced to distribute
their lands, and the trust relationship ceased to exist upon termination. t
In addition to the direct termination of tribes, in 1953, Congress passed Public
Law 83-280 (P.L. 280).62 P.L. 280 required six states to assume most criminal and
some civil jurisdiction over Indian country without a provision for tribal consent.63
Although this federal law did not actually terminate tribal courts, tribes were
discouraged from developing their judiciaries." In addition, P.L. 280 increased
tension between tribes and states in the six "mandatory" states. The tribes resented
having state jurisdiction imposed on them while the states were unhappy because
P.L. 280 forced them to bear the financial burden of exercising this jurisdiction.0
Because of public outrage both on- and off-reservation, the termination era was
short-lived. However, those tribes that were affected by termination paid an
enormous price. The financial burden of pursuing federal re-recognition as tribes
remains a problem for many terminated tribes today.66 Land holdings were lost and
59. COHEN, supra note 9, at 152.
60. Id. at 171-75; PEVAR, supra note 42, at 7.
61. COHEN, supra note 9, at 171-75; DELORIA &LYTLE, supra note 39, at 20.
62. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162
(West 1984) (criminal jurisdiction), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000) and 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1360 (West 1993) (civil jurisdiction)); see also infra Part X.
63. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (civil jurisdiction).
64. JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 36, at 3.
65. Joseph Myers, Cooperation, Appreciation and Understanding: Building Positive Relationships Among
Federal, State and Tribal Courts, TRIBAL Cr. REc., Winter 1999, at 5.
66. The process for re-recognition is long and frustrating because the Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept.
of the Interior (BIA), requirements are often vague (e.g., 25 C.ER. § 83 (1999)), and there is a significant backlog
of work at the BIA. This author has worked on cases in which the applications for re-recognition had been pending
for 10 years or more.
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resources exploited with minimal benefit to tribal members.' Furthermore, funding
for tribal courts was stopped, which resulted in a complete crippling of tribal courts.
In 1959, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Williams v. Lee.s This case marked the end of the termination era. In Williams, the
Court held that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits by non-Indians
against Indians where the dispute arises in Indian country.69 While acknowledging
that prior cases had established the principle that state law has no effect in Indian
country,70 the Court in Williams also asserted that this rule had been softened by
later cases.71
In Williams, the Court set out a crucial test for determining whether a state
court has jurisdiction to hear a matter involving a non-Indian that arises in Indian
country.72 The test concerns the question of whether a state infringes "on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them" if the state
court hears the case.73 It should be noted that the Williams test only applies in
situations in which the dispute involves a non-Indian.74 Much of the law of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country revolves around the application of
this test.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction
over matters involving tribal members residing on the reservation.75 The Court held
that the Williams test did not apply because any assertion of state jurisdiction in
such situations necessarily infringes on the right of tribal self-government.76
L 1968: The Indian Civil Rights Act-Further Limitations
Based in part on a concern for the protection of the rights of criminal
defendants in Indian country and in part on the shock of the non-Indian public that
the U.S. Constitution had no direct application in Indian country, Congress passed
67. DELORIA &LYTLE, supra note 39, at 21.
68. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Specifically, the Court held that tribal courts in non-P.L. 280 states possess
exclusive jurisdiction over civil disputes brought by non-Indians against Indians concerning transactions in Indian
country. Id. at 223.
69. Id. at 223.
70. Id. at 218-19 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
71. Id. The Court justified these incursions on state power because "essential tribal relations were not
involved and ... the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized." Id. at 219.
72. Id. at 220.
73. Id.
74. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting further that the
"Indian sovereignty doctrine.., provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes
must be read').
75. Id. at 172-73.
76. Id. at 179-81.
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the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).n The ICRA reaffirmed tribal powers
of self-government, including the authority to establish courts.78
The "Indian Bill of Rights" in the ICRA requires that criminal defendants in
tribal courts be afforded many of the due process rights afforded to criminal
defendants in state and federal courts pursuant to the U.S. Constitution.79 The rights
enumerated in the ICRA take into consideration the unique conditions of tribal
courts, including the lack of funding of tribal courts and the impoverished
communities that many serve. For example, the ICRA does not require court-
appointed attorneys for indigent defendants. Such a requirement would effectively
drain tribal court resources. The requirements of the ICRA raise the question of
whether tribal courts can remain unique institutions or whether they must be
modeled after Anglo courts and Anglo concepts of justice.80 The ICRA also subjects
tribal court and tribal council decisions to federal review by way of writ of habeas
corpus.81
Later ICRA amendments also modified P.L. 280. First, a provision was added
requiring tribal consent before states could assume P.L. 280jurisdiction over Indian
country after 1968.82 In addition, the ICRA added a mechanism for states to
relinquish P.L. 280 jurisdiction. 3 Unfortunately, this mechanism cannot be initiated
by the tribes.
J. 1970-1980: Revitalizing Tribal Governments and Courts
In the 1970's, the federal policy in Indian affairs focused on the promotion of
tribal self-determination.84 During this era, the Bureau of Indian Affairs established
the Branch of Judicial Services, and funding for tribal court activities increased.
However, the increase in funds failed to meet the tribes' needs because the previous
underfunding was so extreme.85 The financial and technical resources necessary to
effectively develop tribal courts were not available.
During this period, several U.S. Supreme Court decisions affirmed tribal
jurisdiction over civil matters within Indian country. In particular, the Court held
77. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
78. Id. § 1301 (West Supp. 2000).
79. Id. §§ 1302-1303 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
80. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, A REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 8-10 (1991) (describing opposition to the Indian Civil Rights Act by
various Pueblo Tribes of New Mexico because the Act would violate their customs and traditions).
81. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (West 1983); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,66-70 (1978).
82. Id. §§ 1322, 1326 (West 1983).
83. Id. § 1323(a) (West Supp. 2000).
84. President Nixon rejected the termination policy in his message to Congress in 1970 and stated that the
goal of the federal Indian policy must be "to strengthen the Indian sense of autonomy without threatening his
sense of community." See PEVAR, supra note 42, at 8, 11 n.28 (quoting Message from the President of the United
States, 1970, "Recommendations for Indian Policy" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office)).
85. Myers, supra note 65, at 6.
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that states lacked civil jurisdiction to: (1) hear a suit by a non-Indian against an
Indian; 6 (2) tax the income of a tribal member earned on the reservation;' and (3)
decide an adoption case in which all parties are Indian and live on the reservation.
88
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.8 The
Court affirmed tribal courtjurisdiction over a dispute in which a tribal member sued
the tribe for ICRA violations. In this decision, the Supreme Court held that, except
for habeas corpus petitions, the federal courts lack jurisdiction over civil actions
alleging violations of the ICRA.90
Congress further demonstrated its commitment to the policy of tribal
self-determination by enacting the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. 9' The Act
established standards and procedures designed to safeguard the "best interests" of
the Indian child and the security of Indian family units.92 It provided for exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child
domiciled or residing on the reservation or any ward of the tribal court, except
where such jurisdiction is already vested in the state.93 This important statute gives
the tribes maximum control over their most valuable resource-their children.
In 1981, the Supreme Court acknowledged that tribal courts have inherent civil
authority, even over actions of non-Indians when those actions affect "the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.,
9 4
K. 1980-Present: Cutbacks in Federal Funding
Some observers of Indian affairs have labeled the current economic situation
in Indian country as a form of "termination by funding cuts." While the present
administration has acknowledged a government-to-government relationship with
86. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1971) (holding that a non-Indian
merchant could not bring suit in state court against a Blackfeet Indian for a transaction occurring on the
reservation; tribal court was the proper forum for such a suit).
87. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
88. Fisher v. District Court of Montana, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (ruling that Montana did not have
jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties were members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and
residents on that reservation; again, tribal court was the appropriate forum).
89. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
90. ILd. at 51-52.
91. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
92. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (West 1983).
93. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911 (West 1983). But note that there is a conflict among lower courts regarding
whether jurisdiction is concurrent in P.L. 280 states. Compare Native Village of Nenanav. Alaska Dep't of Health
and Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986) (holding that Alaska Native Villages cannot exercise jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings without a reassumption under § 1918 of the Act), with Native Village of Venetle
I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that tribes have concurrent jurisdiction with the
State over ICWA matters where the children are domiciled on the reservation in a P.L. 280 state).
94. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). But note that the Supreme Court has severely
limited this holding through its opinion in Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), discussed in detail infra
Part IX.B.
986
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Indian tribes,95 federal funding for Indian social programs has been cut
dramatically, 96 and federal funds that support tribal government operations have
either decreased or are grossly insufficient to support tribal programs. 97 Also,
Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act in 1993.9' Under this Act, the tribes
were to receive $58.4 million per year to create and expand their justice systems.
However, to date, only $5 million has actually been appropriated pursuant to the
Act, 99 and the Act expired on October 1, 1999. The long-range impact of these
policies has yet to be determined.
In addition to cutbacks in federal funding, recent Supreme Court decisions
demonstrate a shift away from acknowledging and expanding inherent tribal
sovereignty. °° The most disturbing aspect of these cases, aside from their holdings,
is the fact that each of them was a unanimous decision. This means there is little
hope of changing the trend via the judiciary, unless the current Justices come to
understand more about the impact of their decisions in Indian country.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
In an effort to provide comprehensive and practical information for tribal, state
and federal court personnel, advocates and others interested in improving the
interaction among jurisdictions, the remainder of this Article will begin with an
95. See, e.g., Memorandum from President William J. Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on the Govemrnment-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments (May 3,1994)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
96. For example, the Department of the Interior recently closed the Albuquerque office of Indian Health
Services, which had provided medical services to the large Indian population in the Albuquerque area.
97. See, e.g., Theodore R. Quasula, A Tribute to Jack Lee Spencer, TRIBAL Cr. REC., Winter 1999, at 20,
20-21 (noting that a BIA officer, who lost his life in the line of duty, might not have been killed had there been
more federal law enforcement officers on duty); Joseph Myers, Criminal Justice Issues in Indian Country Today,
TRIBAL Cr. REc., Winter 1999, at 7, 8 (noting the dire need for improved detention facilities in Indian country).
98. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.A. § 3613 (West Supp.
2000)).
99. Myers, supra note 65, at 6.
100. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (holding that the tribal court lackedjurisdiction
to hear a personal injury suit brought by a non-Indian spouse of a deceased tribal member against a contractor who
was doing business with the Tribe). Despite the fact that the accident had occurred on a road running through the
reservation, the Court in Strate found that the case did not impact the Tribe's "political integrity, economic
security, health or welfare" simply because the Tribe had granted a right-of-way over the highway to the State.
Id. at 457-58 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)); see also Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (stating that land owned by a Native Alaskan corporation pursuant to the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act was not"Indian country" and therefore was not subject to the Village's taxes); Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (explaining that state and local
governments may impose ad valorem taxes on Indian lands that have been sold to non-Indians under the authority
of a federal statute rendering such lands alienable and later re-acquired by the Tribe); South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (holding that federal environmental laws did not apply to land within the Tribe's
original reservation, despite language in the agreement between the Tribe and federal government stating that all
provisions of a prior treaty were to remain in effect. This decision resulted not only in lack of tribal or federal
environmental control over the land but also in a diminishment of the reservation boundaries).
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explanation of key concepts and terms used in the following discussion of
jurisdiction in Indian country.1t 1
Two distinct types of civil jurisdiction exist. Regulatory jurisdiction is the
authority of a tribe to tax, license and create laws. Adjudicatory jurisdiction is the
power of the tribal court to hear a given case. Often, regulatory jurisdiction implies
adjudicatory jurisdiction over the same matters; however, there may be instances
in which the tribe has the power to regulate a matter but lacks the authority to
adjudicate it.102 The adjudicative authority may lie with the federal government or
the state.10 3 Determining which powers the tribe and state have can be particularly
challenging where the Supreme Court has failed to distinguish whether its holding
in a given case applies to either or both types of jurisdiction. The source of both
regulatory and adjudicatory powers is the tribe's retained inherent authority.t° In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors0 5 suggested that
tribal adjudicatory authority is limited to the scope of its power to regulate."°6 Thus,
the prior presumption that tribes could adjudicate any matter that they had the
power to regulate has recently been called into question.
Generally, the jurisdiction of a tribal court is the power of the court to hear
particular cases. For that authority to exist, the tribal court must demonstrate the
three vital elements of jurisdiction.
First, the court must possess personal jurisdiction, which is the court's power
over the parties to the case. Usually, this authority is set forth in the constitution or
the law and order code of each tribe. Without the authority to demand the presence
of a party, the court would be without the ability to effectively decide the case.
Secondly, there must be a specific territory in which the court is authorized to
assert its power to hear particular cases: territorial jurisdiction. That geographical
area is usually referred to as Indian country and is defined as such at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1151. The definition includes (1) all lands within the exterior boundaries of a
reservation, including patented lands and rights-of-way (for example, roads and
101. Although the explanatory sections of this Article may seem basic to practitioners, this author has
included them for two reasons. First, many judges, prosecutors and advocates in Indian country do not have formal
legal training because knowledge of the tribal customs is often at least as important in effectively adjudicating
issues in tribal courts. Second, even if the reader has extensive legal training, these basic concepts often have
different applications in the context of Indian law and tribal courts. Therefore, even seasoned attorneys andjudges
are urged to read these sections if they anticipate practicing in tribal courts.
102. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (noting that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction will never exceed its regulatory
jurisdiction).
103. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999) (giving the federal government
jurisdiction over enumerated crimes); Id. § 1162 (West 1984) (allowing certain states to exert criminal jurisdiction
over crimes in Indian country).
104. See CONFERENCE OF WEm N ATroRNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DEsKBooK 131
(Nicholas L Spaeth ed., 1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK].
105. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
106. Id. at 453 (stating that "[a]s to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudicativejurisdiction does not exceed
its legislative jurisdiction").
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highways); (2) "all dependent Indian communities" (which may include lands
off-reservation); and (3) all Indian-owned allotments outside the reservation,
including rights-of-way running through them."° The territorial jurisdiction must
also be determined by examining the tribe's governing documents, including its
constitution and codes.
The third element is subject matter jurisdiction, which is the authority of the
court to hear particular types of cases. This authority is set forth in the tribe's
constitution or the law and order code. Some tribal courts exercise broad subject
matter jurisdiction; others are very narrow. For example, some courts may hear
disputes involving contracts, domestic affairs, and torts, while other courts may be
limited to hearing only fishing controversies.
In addition to the three key elements of jurisdiction (personal, territorial and
subject matter), there are three basic types of judicial proceedings: administrative,
criminal and civil. When a case is brought before a hearing officer or review board
of a governmental agency, it is called an administrative proceeding. These
proceedings are not as formal as court proceedings; however, basic due process
protections are required. The parties must receive sufficient notice of the hearing,
and the hearing must be conducted fairly.
A criminal proceeding is one in which the government prosecutes an individual
or firm for an act or omission which the community, through its government, has
deemed to be unlawful. A conviction in a criminal proceeding carries with it the
possibility of imprisonment and/or a fine. Because of restrictions set forth in the
ICRA,03 the maximum punishment a tribal court may impose is imprisonment of
up to one year and a maximum fine of $5,0000.9
Usually, any legal action initiated by a private party to enforce a private right
or to seek compensation for a civil wrong is heard in a civil proceeding. Judgments
in civil proceedings are not limited by ICRA; any limitations on the scope of a civil
proceeding will be described in the tribe's law and order code.
To provide an operable framework for civil proceedings, the law and order code
defines basic terms. First, the code will define the parties to a civil proceeding. The
party who complains of a wrongdoing and brings a civil action seeking relief is
called a plaintiff or petitioner. The party against whom the action is brought is
called the defendant or respondent.
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984). But note that the definition may differ depending on the situation.
For example, certain statutes such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act define Indian country broadly. 25
U.S.C.A. § 2703(4) (West Supp. 2000). Also, certain states, such as California, Oklahoma and Alaska, have
unique histories and have been subject to legislation that affects the definition of Indian country in those states.
See, e.g., Rancheria Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958) (eliminating the legal status of many
California tribes and limiting the land base of others); Curtis Act of 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 504 (forcing the
allotment of Indian territory in Oklahoma); and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998)
(holding that lands held pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act are not Indian country).
108. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
109. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(7) (West Supp. 2000).
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The legal theories which determine whether an injury or civil wrong has
occurred and who is responsible provide the basis for civil substantive law. The
rules which govern the conduct of a civil proceeding are called civil procedural law.
Examples include the form of complaints, filing deadlines and the trial process. The
methods by which a civil right is enforced or for which a civil harm is compensated
are called civil remedies. They include money damages, specific performance,
custody orders and others.
In order for a civil case to be adjudicated in tribal court, complete civil
jurisdiction must exist, and the authority must be bestowed in the tribal governing
documents. Additionally, the basic framework for civil proceedings must be
enumerated in the code. In a sense, civil jurisdiction follows the principles of
criminal jurisdiction. Like criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction starts from a
presumption that tribes have power over their internal affairs. Congress and the
federal courts have not intruded upon tribal civil jurisdiction as much as they have
in criminal matters, so the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction remains broad. State
jurisdiction in both areas is confined to matters not involving Indians and not
affecting Indian interests, ° although this line is not always clear and sometimes is
crossed.
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe... that
Indian tribes lacked authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. n2 In
response to the Oliphant decision, several tribes decriminalized certain tribal
statutes in order to fill the void created by that decision. As a result of this response,
the distinction between criminal and civil is often blurred in tribal jurisdictions.
Oliphant was decided against a backdrop of 150 years of federal criminal
legislation that assumed an absence of tribal governmental authority to punish non-
Indians who violated tribal laws. In contrast, no such pattern of federal legislation
exists in the civil area. Instead, the federal government has made little attempt to
undertake the adjudication of private civil disputes in Indian country.
The Supreme Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians'13 held that the Oliphant criminal jurisdictional presumption did not
apply to civil disputes arising in Indian country and involving non-Indians. 14
However, more recently in Strate v. A-i Contractors,115 the Supreme Court held that
tribes have no inherent authority to adjudicate civil disputes involving only
nontribal members absent express congressional authority to the contrary. While the
110. This is true except in states to which Public Law 280.28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (Vest 1993), or other such
federal legislation, applies.
111. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
112. Id. at 195.
113. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
114. IL at 854.
115. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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Strate Court reiterated certain "exceptions"' 16 to this presumption enumerated in the
case Montana v. United States,'1 7 the decision in Strate potentially limits tribal
court civil jurisdiction and adds to the tension between tribal and state courts. The
case and its possible ramifications for tribal court jurisdiction are discussed
below.""
IV. INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JURISDICrION
The mid 1800's brought extensive settlement and development to regions which
had been inhabited only by tribes. The resulting proximity between Indian and non-
Indian communities amplified the differences in the value systems of the
communities, especially in the area of criminal penalties. Indian communities
fought and won the right to apply tribal laws to their community members. In 1883,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Ex parte Crow Dog," 9 which
recognized that Indian tribes possessed exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed by one tribal member against another tribal member in Indian country. '20
The Crow Dog case involved a murder of one member of the Sioux Tribe by
another. Responding in the traditional way that focused on restitution rather than
revenge, the victim's family agreed to take $600, eight horses and a blanket as
payment for the murder.12 Outraged by what it perceived as an insufficient
response to the murder, and based on pressure by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act'2 in 1885, just two years after the
Crow Dog decision. This statute gave the federal government jurisdiction over
several "major" crimes committed within Indian country, including murder.'23
The next significant U.S. Supreme Court decision was Talton v. Mayes," in
which the Court held that tribal criminal jurisdiction derived from inherent tribal
sovereignty.'2 As a result, certain constitutional limitations, such as the Bill of
Rights, did not apply to tribal governments. The Court later held that the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy did not apply to prosecutions of
offenses by tribal governments and federal or state governments. 26 But the
Supreme Court severely limited tribal court jurisdiction in the case of Oliphant v.
116. Id. at 1409-10.
117. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
118. Infra Part XB.
119. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
120. a at 571-72.
121. DAvID H. GErIcua ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 157 (4th ed. 1998).
122. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999).
123. Id.
124. 163 U.S. 376 (1896); see also GETCMHES ET AL, supra note 121, at 470.
125. 163 U.S. at 383-84.
126. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1978); GETcHEs Er AL., supra note 121, at 470.
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Suquamish Tribe, 27 in which it held that the tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over
offenses committed by non-Indians in Indian country.128 The question of whether
tribes may apply tribal law to non-Indians or nonmember Indians has shaped the
issue of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.
Jurisdiction over criminal activity in Indian country requires consideration of
a complex mixture of federal, state and tribal law. Proper criminal jurisdiction may
be asserted by federal, state and/or tribal courts, depending on the circumstances.
Finding a path through this jurisdictional maze requires an examination of several
factors, such as which federal statutes apply; whether the state has jurisdiction
pursuant to P.L. 280;129 what the nature of the offense is (e.g., whether it is a "major
crime"); 30 the location of the criminal activity (e.g., whether it occurred in Indian
country); and whether the offender and/or the victim is a tribal member,
nonmember Indian or non-Indian. This inquiry is further complicated by conflicting
appellate court opinions. The following Parts will examine each of these factors.
V. FEDERAL STATUTES
Congressional legislation often applies generally to "Indians" and "Indian
country," rather than to specific tribes or reservation territories. To determine the
scope and purpose of federal legislation concerning Indians and Indian country,
tribal, state and federal judiciaries must have a thorough understanding of these
terms of art.
A. "Indian" Defined
The term "Indian" has long been obsolete with respect to the culture of
members of tribes in the United States; however, it is a term that Congress has
adopted to refer to tribes as a single political body as well as a cultural entity. The
question of who is an Indian has been repeatedly asked in the history of the United
States. The answer differs depending on the circumstances,' but generally
speaking, the legal definition of an Indian includes anyone who is a member of a
federally recognized tribe.'3 2
127. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
128. Id. at 195.
129. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (West 1984).
130. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999).
131. For a thorough discussion of the various legal definitions of the term "Indian," see PEVAR, supra note
42, at 12, 13.
132. 25 U.S.C.A. § 479 (West 1983). This is just one statutory definition. As stated in the text, the
definition varies depending on the circumstances. For example, a person is an Indian eligible for federal health
benefits even if she is a member of a tribe that was terminated. Ultimately, tribes have the inherent authority to
determine their own membership, see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), but note that these legal
definitions of "Indian" have no cultural significance for the tribes.
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B. Indian Country as Defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151
Congress defines Indian country in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 as including:
(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) All dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) All
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same."'
This definition encompasses all lands within the exterior boundaries of a
reservation, even if the land is held in fee simple by a non-Indian entity or person. 134
It also includes lands deemed to be "dependent Indian communities" which may be
located on trust land outside the reservation boundaries.' 35 For lands to be
considered Indian country, the federal government must have set the land aside for
the use of the tribes, and the lands must be under federal superintendence.'36
C. Indian Country Crimes Act (General Crimes Act): 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152
The Indian Country Crimes Act,137 also known as and hereinafter referred to as
the General Crimes Act, states that:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations the exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 138
133. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
134. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
135. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b) (West 1984).
136. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 530-31 (1998).
137. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West 1984).
138. Id.
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The General Crimes Act provides for the application of federal criminal statutes
to activities in Indian country with the exceptions of "Indian v. Indian offenses"' 39
or activities performed pursuant to treaty stipulations.140 Such federal laws include
the same statutes applicable to federal enclaves such as military installations and
national parks. 141 The Act's reference to "punish[ment] by the local law of the
tribe ' 42 has been interpreted to allow concurrent jurisdiction by tribal courts. 43
Cases involving "victimless" crimes, such as adultery, in which all parties are
Indians, have been construed to come within the "Indian v. Indian" exception. 144
Although the issue arose in a case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
refrained from resolving whether the "Indian v. Indian" exception applies to crimes
by nonmember Indians. 145 Nonetheless, a literal reading of the exception indicates
that federal prosecution is barred.' 46
Prior to 1881, the General Crimes Act, which has no explicit provisions for
"non-Indian v. non-Indian" crimes in Indian country, was applied so that federal
jurisdiction over such crimes preempted state jurisdiction.147 In 1881, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in United States v. McBratneyt4g that the State of Colorado
could assert jurisdiction in "non-Indian v. non-Indian" crimes.149 The Court
reasoned that, because Colorado was not required to disclaim jurisdiction over
Indian country upon its entry into the Union, the State could rightfully assert
jurisdiction on the basis of the equal footing doctrine.' 5° The equal footing doctrine
was later supplanted by the reasoning that neither the tribes nor the federal
government had any interest in matters affecting only non-Indians in Indian
country, except prior to there being a state government to handle such matters.'15
139. Note that certain "Indian v. Indian" crimes may be governed by the Major Crimes Act, discussed Infra
Part IV.
140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152.
141. GErCHES ETAL, supra note 121, at 472.
142. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152.
143. See Tm Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants'
Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1974) (asserting that the exclusion in the Act of federal
jurisdiction over Indian v. Indian crimes and crimes that have been punished by the tribes implies that tribes retain
jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians).
144. See United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 386 n.4 (8th Cir. 1983).
145. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990).
146. AMERICANINDiANLAw DSKOOK, supra note 104, at 89 n.22.
147. GETCHEs ET AL, supra note 121, at 472.
148. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
149. Id at 624.
150. Id The equal footing doctrine allowed states that were admitted into the Union after the original 13
states to enjoy the same sovereign interests. The doctrine is most often used in Indian law today with respect to
title rights involving navigable waterways.
151. New York exre/. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496,500-01 (1946); GETCHESETAL, supra note 121, at 799
n.*; see also Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 244, 247 (1896) (holding that Montana, a state which had
disclaimed jurisdiction as a condition of statehood, may assert jurisdiction over a murder of one non-Indian by
another on the Crow Reservation).
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D. Assimilative Crimes Act: 18 U.S.C.A. § 13
The Assimilative Crimes Act t5 2 incorporates into federal law any state penal
statutes where a federal enclave is located. Because it is a "general law," the
Assimilative Crimes Act is made applicable to Indian country pursuant to the
General Crimes Act,15 3 discussed above. Federal appellate courts have been divided
on the extent of its application. For example, one area of dispute is whether the
Assimilative Crimes Act incorporates into federal law state penal statutes that have
a civil regulatory objective but impose criminal sanctions for noncompliance.' 14
Some courts focus on whether the underlying purpose of the state statute is to
prohibit certain conduct or to regulate it, while other courts reject this distinction.' 55
The division among the lower courts stems from the difficulty in characterizing
those statutes that involve "victimless" crimes or consensual behavior. In addition,
certain statutes, such as fireworks statutes, fall into a "gray" area that is neither
clearly regulatory nor prohibitory.1
5 6
E. Major Crimes Act: 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153
In 1885, two years after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Crow
Dog5 7 recognized exclusive tribal criminal jurisdiction over a murder case
involving an Indian victim and defendant, Congress adopted the Major Crimes
Act. 58 The Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
152. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West Supp. 1999). The Assimilative Crimes Act provides:
(a) Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as
provided in section 7 of this title... is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within
the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by
the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and
subject to a like punishment;]
(b) [F]or purposes of subsection (a) of this section, that which may or shall be imposed through
judicial or administrative action under the law of a State, territory, possession, or district for a
conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol, shall be
considered to be a punishment provided by that law. Any limitation on the right or privilege to
operate a motor vehicle imposed under this subsection shall apply only to the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
153. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West 1984).
154. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DEsKBOOK, supra note 104, at 87 n.13 (giving examples of the
jurisdictional splits among various circuit courts).
155. Id.
156. l For a further discussion of the jurisdictional issues raised by the Assimilative Crimes Act, see
GErCHES Er AL, supra note 121, at 483.
157. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
158. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999).
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specifically enumerated crimes occurring on the reservation, regardless of whether
the victim and defendant are Indian.' 59
The Major Crimes Act states:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest,
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this
title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16
years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as
all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not
defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in
accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed
as are in force at the time of such offense."6°
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved the question,16 1 several federal
courts have concluded that tribes may still exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
cases which are subject to federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Act.'62
Another controversial issue concerns a U.S. Supreme Court finding that a
defendant has the right to request a lesser included offense instruction in a Major
Crimes Act prosecution, even though the offense was not one of those specified
under the statute.1'6 The Court reasoned that, in such situations, tribal self-
government interests were unaffected, because the ability of a defendant to request
the lesser included offense instruction "neither expands the reach of the Major
Crimes Act nor permits the Government to infringe the residual jurisdiction of a
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DEsKBOOK, supra note 104, at 90 n.29 (noting the unresolved question
of whether § 1153 abrogates retained tribal jurisdiction to prosecute members for major crimes (citing United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,325 n.22 (1978), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,679 n.1 (1990))).
162. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DEsKBooK, supra note 104, at 90 n.29 (concluding that a tribe has
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over conduct constituting a major crime) (citing People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294,
1298-99 (Colo. 1990); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 E3d 823 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that tribal court has concurrent
criminal jurisdiction over a tribal member with respect to conduct for which the member has been prosecuted
under the Major Crimes Act). But note that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (West 1983
& Supp. 2000), limits the criminal penalties a tribe may impose to one year imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.
163. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205,214 (1973).
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tribe by bringing prosecutions in federal court that are not authorized by statute."' 64
The Supreme Court failed to address the issue of whether lesser included offense
instructions could be requested absent the defendant's consent. Lower courts are
divided on this issue.16
F State Criminal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Public Law 280
In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 83-280 (P.L. 280),' 66 which requires
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin to exercise limited civil
and extensive criminal jurisdiction over Indian country within their borders. In
1958, Alaska was also made a mandatory P.L. 280 state.' 67 The General Crimes Act
and the Major Crimes Act are inapplicable to Indian country crimes in these six
mandatory states. 68
Codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a), the statute provides:
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of
Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same
extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State
or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country
as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
State or
Territory of Indian country affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except that on
Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community
may exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by
Indians in the same manner in which such jurisdiction
may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country
over which State jurisdiction has not been extended.
164. Id; see also AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 104, at 90 n.29 (citing Keeble, 412 U.S.
at 214).
165. Compare United States v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing such instructions over
defendant's objections), with United States v. Narcia, 776 F. Supp. 491 (D. Ariz. 1991) (denying prosecutor's
attempt to charge the defendant under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 with a lesser included offense over the defendant's
objections).
166. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280,67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162
(West 1984), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993)).
167. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a).
168. Id. § 1162(c).
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California All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota All Indian country within the State, except the Red
Lake Reservation.
Nebraska All Indian country within the State.
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except the Warm
Springs Reservation.
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State.
While sweeping in nature, P.L. 280 was not novel legislation. Kansas, Iowa, New
York and North Dakota at different times had been granted varying levels of
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country located within their state
borders.' 69
Originally, P.L. 280 allowed for states to voluntarily assume P.L. 280 civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country located within their borders without
consultation with the tribes. However, in 1968, an amendment to the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968'70 required an affirmative vote by affected tribal members at a
special election authorizing state assumption of criminal or civil jurisdiction. 17 The
amendments also allow states to retrocede any jurisdiction they had voluntarily
assumed prior to the effective date of those amendments or of any jurisdiction
mandatorily imposed under 18 U.S.C.A. §1162(a). 72 Unfortunately, this process
must be initiated by the states and cannot be initiated by the affected tribes.
The extent of P.L. 280 jurisdiction has been an issue of significant contention.
TheU.S. Supreme Court has held that P.L. 280 authorizes criminal jurisdiction only
169. See AMERXCANINDIANLAwDESKBOOKsupra note 104, at 94 n.42 (noting that (1) 18 U.S.C.A. § 3243
(West 1985) grants Kansas jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian country but does not deprive federal
jurisdiction pursuant to the General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act; (2) Public Law 80-846 (1948) grants
Iowa similar jurisdiction over the Sac and Fox Indian Reservation; (3) 25 U.S.C.A. § 232 (West 1983), which
grants New York criminal jurisdiction over offenses by Indians, has been construed as concurrent in nature; and
(4) that 60 Stat. 229 (1946) grants North Dakota jurisdiction over nonmajor criminal offenses committed by or
against Indians on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation).
170. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
171. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a) (West 1983).
172. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1323 (West Supp. 2000).
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with respect to criminal-prohibitory, and not civil-regulatory, laws. 73 The Court in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians74 reasoned that:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls
within [P.L. 280]'s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law
generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be
classified as civil/regulatory and [P.L. 280] does not authorize its
enforcement on Indian reservations. The shorthand test is whether the
conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.'75
In essence, the Cabazon ruling prevents P.L. 280 states from applying state laws to
interfere with activities in Indian country that the state does not outright prohibit.
Unfortunately, this distinction is not always clear, as in the case of fireworks
discussed above. 176
VI. CASE PRECEDENT
The federal legislation discussed above is the starting point for the analysis of
criminal jurisdiction over cases that arise in Indian country. But there are aspects
of criminal jurisdiction that these statutes do not address. For example, the Major
Crimes Act 177 only pertains to crimes committed by one Indian against another
Indian. The statute is further limited to the enumerated crimes. Therefore, many of
the parameters of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country have been developed over
the years by the courts.
Until fairly recently, those tribes that had the resources to assert criminal
jurisdiction within their territory did so to the fullest extent possible under the
federal statutes. Then the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,78 in which it held that tribes may not assert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians in disputes that arise in Indian country. 79 This holding
has severely hampered the tribes' ability to maintain law and order within the
reservation boundaries. It also undermined tribal sovereignty, not only because of
the direct holding, but because the Supreme Court and other courts have taken the
reasoning of Oliphant and applied it to other fact situations. For example, the
Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina 8° held that a tribe may not assert criminal
173. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1987).
174. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
175. Id. at 209.
176. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing this murky area of the law).
177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999).
178. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
179. Id. at 195.
180. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
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jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian, reasoning that the nonmember was a non-
Indian for purposes of tribal court criminal jurisdiction.181
The Duro decision resulted in a critical jurisdictional gap in Indian country
because states lack criminal jurisdiction in Indian country (except in P.L. 280
states), and the federal government usually only prosecutes crimes under the Major
Crimes Act due to funding constraints. Congress responded to the Duro decision
by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act 82 to (1) recognize and affirm the inherent
power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, and (2)
explicitly expand the definition to include any person defined as an Indian under 18
U.S.C.A. §1153 (the Major Crimes Act) to be within the criminal jurisdiction of
tribal courts.
13
However, one lower court refused to follow the legislation. In United States v.
Weaselhead,'4 the Eighth Circuit held that it was for the Supreme Court to decide
a tribe's inherent sovereignty and that it was "beyond Congress's power to declare
existent a sovereignty-based jurisdiction that the Court has declared to be
nonexistent."8 5 But, as the dissent in Weaselhead pointed out, neither caselaw nor
the Constitution supports the majority's opinion.1 6 In fact, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs.'17
Although the Eighth Circuit vacated its earlier decision in Weaselhead and
affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of tribal court jurisdiction,"8 it is worth
discussing the court's reasoning since it demonstrates the lengths to which courts
can go to undermine tribal sovereignty. Basically, the majority in Weaselhead
attempted to turn the plenary power doctrine on its head. The concept of plenary
power is based on federal case law; nowhere in the Constitution does it actually say
that Congress has plenary power over Indians. The Constitution merely says that
Congress has the right to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.1 9 The doctrine
is based instead on two hundred years of U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the "Indian Commerce Clause" as giving Congress such power.
But the Weaselhead court directly challenged this authority and all of the prior
case law by declaring that Congress had acted beyond its scope when it enacted the
post-Duro legislation. Such an assertion implies that all Supreme Court cases
involving Indian law issues that invoke or mention the plenary power doctrine
181. Id at 679.
182. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1303 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
183. Id § 1301 (West Supp. 2000).
184. United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd en bane, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1999).
185. Id. at 824.
186. Id. at 824-25.
187. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
188. United States v. Weasethead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999).
189. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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(which is most, if not all, such cases) are "constitutional" cases. This would mean
that Congress cannot enact legislation that contradicts any of these cases.190
Furthermore, this interpretation would render the plenary power doctrine
meaningless. But the Supreme Court has never challenged such authority. In fact,
the Supreme Court in Talton v. Mayes,19' a case dating back to 1896, specifically
held that the sovereign powers exercised by the tribes did not spring from the
Constitution.'92 The Mayes Court further held that, because the tribes' powers of
self-government pre-dated the Constitution, the tribes are not bound by the
provisions of the Constitution unless Congress specifically states otherwise. 93
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's reason for not following the post-Duro legislation
contradicts Supreme Court precedent.' 94 Possibly realizing that its reasoning was
erroneous, the Eighth Circuit later vacated its holding and affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the tribal court did have jurisdiction. 195
In non-P.L. 280 states, the issue arises as to what to do when a fugitive crosses
the border from the jurisdiction that seeks to arrest him. Neither jurisdiction has the
legal authority to make such an arrest absent an extradition agreement or federal
statute conferring that right.196 However, many state courts have upheld such
arrests, especially when they involved a "hot pursuit" chase of a suspect onto a
reservation.' 97
VII. THE SCOPE OF CIvIL JURISDICTION
As noted above, the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts has been extremely
limited by federal courts and federal legislation. However, the civil jurisdiction of
tribal courts over disputes that arise in Indian country is more broad and is subject
190. See James W. Zion, New Attacks on Indian Nation Criminal Jurisdiction: Is Congress' "Plenary
Power" Really Plenary?, TRIBAL Cr. REC., Winter 1999, at 12.
191. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
192. Id. at 384. In fact, the Court held that:
[A]lthough [the tribes are] possessed of these attributes of local self government, when exercising their
tribal functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of the United States. But
the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the [Indian
tribes] shall be exercised does not render such local powers Federal powers arising from and created
by the Constitution of the United States.
ld (citation omitted).
193. Id.
194. It should also be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Strate v. A-] Contractors,
acknowledged approvingly this post-Duro legislation. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 444-45 n.5
(1997). Obviously, the Court knew its Duro decision was not a constitutional decision.
195. United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999).
196. See GErcHE Er AL, supra note 121, at 421.
197. Id.; see also Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Fresh Pursuit onto Native American
Reservations: State Rights "To Pursue Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border" 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 191,
195, 238 (1988) (stating that the reservation boundary should act as an "unassailable bar" to any state arrests in
Indian country).
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to fewer of the federal limitations imposed on tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction.
Tribal courts are limited in civil cases involving tribal members only by the tribal
code. Absent restrictions in the tribal code in cases involving a non-Indian
petitioner and an Indian respondent, the tribal courts are able to hear any case in
which they can obtain service of process for the Indian defendant. In cases that do
not involve tribal members, the extent of the tribal courts' jurisdiction is more
limited.
VIII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES
There are three types of jurisdiction that any court, including a tribal court,
must establish before it can properly hear a matter. They include personal
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. The discussion
of territorial jurisdiction based on the site of the dispute is included in both the
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction sections, as the considerations
are slightly different for each of these areas. 198
Personal jurisdiction is the power of the court to require a party to an action to
appear.199 Tribal courts, like other civil courts, acquire jurisdiction over defendants
by service of process within their territory, by residence and constructive service,
orby long-arm service for suits arising from activity within the court's geographical
jurisdiction. There are no inherent limits on dollar amounts or the exercise of
equitable remedies in tribal court civil jurisdiction. Those limits have been made
by certain tribes but have not been imposed by the federal government and cannot
be imposed by state authorities.2'
A. Parties
The parties can include any combination of tribal members, nonmember Indians
and non-Indians. The tribal governing documents, including the constitution and
codes, specify the parties over which it can have personal jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction may be restricted to tribal members living on the reservation, or it may
be very broad and include anyone who comes onto the reservation or conducts any
198. See infra Part VIII (discussing territorial jurisdiction with respect to personal jurisdiction); infra Part
IX (reviewing territorial jurisdiction in the context of subject matter jurisdiction).
199. While this discussion may seem simplistic to some practitioners, it is included because the concepts
discussed here may have slightly different applications in Indian country. It is also included for the benefit of tribal
court personnel who may not have formal legal training.
200. For example, a tribe might limit the amount a plaintiff can recover in a civil case. These limits balance
the rights of plaintiffs to receive compensation and the reality that tribal member defendants may not have the
financial resources to pay large judgments.
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business with the tribe. Thus, the starting point for any inquiry of personal
jurisdiction is the tribal constitution and codes.2 t
B. Methods of Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction
1. Service of Process
The first requirement for personal jurisdiction is service of process on the party.
This is the act of giving notice to the party that a lawsuit has been filed against him.
Usually, service of process is accomplished by having a tribal police officer or a
private process server physically hand a copy of the complaint to the party. This
ensures that the party has notice and the ability to respond to the suit within the time
set out in the tribal code, usually thirty days from the date the party receives the
papers.
As long as the party comes on to the reservation, service of process is not a
complicated issue. However, if the person being sued does not come on to the
reservation after the dispute arises, as in the case of a nonresident involved in a car
accident, then service of process can become a more difficult issue. Again, the
starting point is the tribal constitution and codes. These documents should authorize
service of process off the reservation. In addition, there must be some agreement
between the state and the tribe to allow for service of process off the reservation
when the party cannot be served on the reservation. Absent both of these elements,
the tribal court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresidents not present on
the reservation.
It is also worth noting that the service of process issue is similar when a party
to an action filed in state court is attempting to serve a tribal member who is
domiciled on the reservation. Unless the tribe and state have an agreement or the
state is a P.L. 280 state, a state official or process server cannot serve a tribal
member within the boundaries of the reservation.
2. Domicile and Residence
While the terms "domicile" and "residence" are generally interchangeable, the
difference can be crucial if the tribal code makes such a distinction. Domicile, in
legal terms, is the place in which a person lives and intends to stay for the indefinite
future-in other words, the person's permanent residence.202 A person has only one
201. This point cannot be over-emphasized. Many litigators in state and federal courts fail to look to the
tribal constitution and codes prior to filing lawsuits, forcing the tribal court to untangle the mess the lawyers have
created. For instance, a county sheriff may think he has the right to serve process on a tribal member within the
reservation, but unless such authority is expressly granted in the tribal code or in a written agreement between the
tribe and the county, such service will be improper, and the court will lack personal jurisdiction to hear the case.
202. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 501 (7th ed. 1999).
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domicile. In contrast, a residence is the place in which a person is staying at a given
point in time.20 3 A student, traveler, or military personnel can have a residence
different from her domicile. Or someone may have several residences, as in a
summer home and a winter home. The distinction between domicile and residence
is only relevant when the tribal code permits service of process or personal
jurisdiction only for domiciliaries of the reservation and not for residents. In most
cases, however, the words are interchangeable, and the tribe may serve process on
anyone domiciled or residing on the reservation. In addition, the tribal court will
have personal jurisdiction over them as well.
3. Tribal Long-Arm Statute Plus Minimum Contacts and Fairness
The more complicated issue arises when the defendant is neither domiciled nor
residing on the reservation. The starting point is the tribal code's "long-arm
statute." A long-arm statute is a law that allows the forum (i.e., the tribal court) to
obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action involving tribal
members and/or tribal interests. The tribe's long-ann statute will specify exactly
who is within the court's personal jurisdiction. The statute may be very broad,
allowing the tribal court to hear matters involving any nonresident who can be
properly served, or it may be very narrow, allowing jurisdiction over tribal
members only.
In addition to the tribe's long-arm statute, any exercise of tribal court
jurisdiction should pass the United States Supreme Court's test in International
Shoe Co. v Washington.2° In short, this test requires that the party should have
certain minimum contacts20 5 with the tribe such that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be fair.2° Generally, if the cause of action arises out of20 7 or is
"substantially" related to23 such contacts, then the assertion of jurisdiction is fair.
For example, if a car accident occurred within the reservation, and there is a lawsuit
in tribal court based on that accident, then the cause of action is said to arise out of
the contacts. But for the parties driving on the reservation roads, the accident would
not have occurred. Or where there is a contract between the tribe and a corporation
run by nontribal members, and a dispute arises as to the terms or performance of the
contract, that transaction relates to the contact with the tribe.2(n
203. Il at 1310.
204. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
205. Id at 316.
206. lid; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
207. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984).
208. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
209. But note that several lower courts have held that the level of minimum contacts with the tribal forum
must be higher for a tribe to assert personal jurisdiction than if the tribe were a state. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc.
v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418,431 (D. Ariz. 1981). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.
1983); Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 NAV.2d 638, 645 (1993); see also Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian
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IX. SUBJEcT MATrER JURISDICTION
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear the type of matter
before it. For example, if a lawsuit involves personal injuries from an accident that
occurred outside the reservation boundaries between two non-Indians, the tribal
court would not have the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. This is
because the tribe would lack an interest in the outcome and the authority to properly
apply its laws to the situation. But if the matter involved the divorce of two tribal
members domiciled on the reservation, the tribal court would have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, as long as the tribal code allows the court to hear the
matter. It is important to note that one of the main differences between personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction is that personal jurisdiction can be
waived by the parties while subject matter jurisdiction cannot.210 This means that
a party that otherwise would not be reachable by the court, either because it could
not be properly served or the jurisdiction's long-arm statute does not allow for
personal jurisdiction over the party, can agree to appear before the court anyway,
thus waiving the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. In contrast, the parties cannot
waive subject matter jurisdiction because this involves the forum's interest in
hearing the matter before it, not the parties' interests.
If the tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, such
jurisdiction can either be exclusive or concurrent with the state or the federal courts
(or another tribal court). Exclusive jurisdiction means that only one court-tribal,
state or federal-has the adjudicatory authority to hear the case. For example, under
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),1 tribes in non-RL. 280 states have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear child custody matters involving Indian children
domiciled or residing on the reservation. Concurrentjurisdiction means that more
than one court can hear the matter. An example of tribal-state concurrent
jurisdiction is a divorce proceeding in which one spouse is a tribal member
domiciled on the reservation and the other spouse is domiciled off the reservation.
Either the state or the tribal court could hear such a matter. As discussed more fully
below, where more than one court has jurisdiction over a case, there is a potential
for conflicting judgments if both courts hear the matter to its completion. Most of
the disputes regarding subject matter jurisdiction are between the tribes and the
state.
Country: The Confising Parameters of State, Federal and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539, 574
(1997) (stating that "[b]oth state and federal courts have asserted, without clear doctrinal justification, that
establishing the personal jurisdiction of the tribal courts 'requires more in the way of minium contacts than would
be sufficient for the citizen of one state to assert personal jurisdiction over the citizen of another state."') (quoting
from Babbitt Ford, supra.)
210. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,398 (1975); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237,244 (1934).
211. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
212. Id. § 1911 (West 1983).
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There are certain matters over which tribes have exclusive jurisdiction, either
due to treaties, federal legislation or Supreme Court decisions. For example, some
tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on the reservation
pursuant to treaties; all non-P.L. 280 state tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings of Indian children who are domiciled on the reservation
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act;2 13 and tribes have the exclusive
jurisdiction to tax the income of tribal members derived solely from on-reservation
activities."'
A. Parties
1. Civil Jurisdiction over Tribal Members
Assuming that the tribal code allows for personal jurisdiction over all tribal
members, the tribal court has jurisdiction to hear any dispute authorized under the
code where the parties are all tribal members. There is no federal legislation that
limits the civil authority of a tribe to regulate and adjudicate matters involving tribal
members when the dispute arises on the reservation. The only limitation on such
jurisdiction is the tribal code. If the tribe is in a non-P.L. 280 state, then such
jurisdiction is exclusive;2 5 if it is located in a P.L. 280 state, then the tribal
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state court.21 6
2. Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians
Although it was traditionally assumed that tribes had civil subject matter
jurisdiction over disputes involving any Indians when the dispute arose on the
reservation, this assumption has been called into question by various recent court
cases. The U.S. Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina217 first distinguished between
member Indians and nonmember Indians in the criminal context, and held that the
tribal court lacked criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.218 Although
Congress legislatively overruled Duro,219 the holding indicates a growing trend by
courts from the Supreme Court down toward confining tribal court jurisdiction to
matters involving tribal members. By focusing on the membership status of the
213. Id. § 1911(a) (West 1983).
214. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Conin'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973).
215. See. e.g., williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Merrion
v. Jcarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
216. See Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1990); Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council
v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1991).
217. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
218. .
219. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301(2) (West Supp. 2000) (affirming the tribe's inherent authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians within the tribe's borders).
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parties, rather than the geographic boundaries of the reservation, the Supreme Court
and lower courts continue to make it more difficult for the tribes to preserve the
integrity of their political and social units.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court's language in its recent decision of Strate
v. A-1 Contractors220 suggests that nonmember Indians may hold the same status
as non-Indians even in civil disputes. Strate uses the term "nonmember" throughout
the decision, instead of using the word "non-Indian." Whether this was intentional
is not clear from the decision, but it does call into question the civil adjudicatory
authority of a tribal court in matters involving nonmember Indians if the dispute
arises on fee land.
3. Civil Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
Williams v. Lee22' was the first modem case to address whether the state or
tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases involving an Indian and
non-Indian in a dispute that arose in Indian country. The Supreme Court in Williams
held that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by a non-Indian
against an Indian when the claim arose in Indian country.tm The assertion of state
jurisdiction in those circumstances would infringe "on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' ' m This has become known
as the Williams "infringement" test.
When the activity occurs on the reservation, the court must determine the extent
of its jurisdiction by examining whether the Indian party is the plaintiff or the
defendant in the action. If the Indian party is the defendant and the suit is filed in
state court, then the Williams infringement test definitely applies, and the tribe has
exclusive jurisdiction. If, however, the Indian party is the plaintiff, then the state
court has concurrent jurisdiction with the tribe, despite the fact that the dispute
arose in Indian country.224
In order for a court to decide whether it has civil jurisdiction, it must determine
the site of the dispute. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian
lands. Indian tribes also retain some inherent sovereign power to exercise some
220. 520 U.S. 438 (1997); see also infra Part IX.B.
221. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
222. Id.
223. ld. at 220.
224. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 148
(1984) (stating that the Supreme Court "repeatedly has approved the exercise ofjurisdiction by state courts over
claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those claims arose in Indian country... .The interests
implicated in such cases are very different from those present in Williams v. Lee, where a non-Indian sued an
Indian in state court for debts incurred in Indian country").
225. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
226. Id.
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forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservations, even on non-Indian
fee lands.227 In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Montana v. United States. 2 8 The
Court devised a new test to determine the civil regulatory jurisdiction of a tribe over
a non-Indian on non-Indian-owned lands within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation. The test set out in Montana to determine whether a tribe has civil
jurisdiction contains four elements:
(1) Whether the non-Indian entered into any consensual relationship with
the tribe or its members. For example, whether there have been any
commercial dealings, contracts, leases or other arrangements;
(2) Whether the non-Indian's activity threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity of the tribe;
(3) Whether the non-Indian's activity threatens or has some direct effect on the
economic security of the tribe; and
(4) Whether the non-Indian's activity threatens or has some direct effect on the
health or welfare of the tribe. 9
B. Strate v. A-1 Contractors
1. Montana Test After Strate
The Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors' extended the Montana test to apply
to determinations of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. This case
involved a car accident on a highway that ran through the Fort Berthold Reservation
in North Dakota. The land on which the highway was constructed was part of the
trust land of the Tribe, but a right-of-way had been granted to the state for the
highway. The accident was between a driver of a truck, which was owned by a non-
Indian company doing business with the Tribe, and the non-Indian wife of a
deceased tribal member. Her children were tribal members, and she claimed to be
residing on the reservation, facts which the Supreme Court found to be irrelevant
to its decision.2'
In its analysis of whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear the personal
injury suit brought by the wife of the tribal member and her children, the Strate
Court modified the way in which the Montana test was applied. Instead of using the
227. Jurisdiction over fee parcels within the exterior boundaries of a reservation is one of the most often
litigated jurisdictional issues. Due to the allotment of Indian lands under the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C.A.
§§ 331-358 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000). most reservations contain both fee land (usually owned by nonmembers
as a result of allotment) and trust land owned by the tribe and tribal members.
228. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
229. Id. at 565-66.
230. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
231. Id. at 457.
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four-part test outlined above, the Court in Strate held that the Montana test starts
with the presumption that "tribes lack civil [adjudicatory] authority over the
conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to two
exceptions."' 2 Those two exceptions are: (1) where the individual has entered into
a consensual agreement with the tribe or its members; and (2) where the conduct
of the nonmember threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
economic security, health or welfare of the tribe. 3 In addition, the Court stated that
the tribe's adjudicative authority does not exceed its legislative authority unless
Congress has specifically enlarged the tribal court's jurisdiction.'
This decision diluted the strength of the Montana holding in several respects.
First, it requires that the inquiry regarding tribal court jurisdiction begin with the
presumption that the tribal court does not have jurisdiction in civil matters
involving non-Indians on non-Indian land.25 The tribal court may only hear such
a case if one of the "exceptions" applies. This analysis is the exact opposite of the
Montana holding, which began with the presumption that there was tribal court
jurisdiction if any element of the four-part test outlined in the holding had been
met.z 6 While this distinction may seem subtle, it is crucial because the starting
point after Strate is that there is no tribal court jurisdiction over matters involving
non-Indians on fee land. Thus, the burden is on the tribal court to rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that the matter falls within one of the two
exceptions.
The Court also dismissed the first part of the Montana test as being inapplicable
in Strate.2a7 That is, the Court concluded that A-l's connection with the Tribe was
irrelevant to the discussion because the plaintiff was not a party to the contract
between A-I and the Tribe.2 8 However, A-l's connection was very relevant: but
for A-l's business relationship with the Tribe, it is unlikely that their driver would
have been on the highway running through the reservation. Thus, without the
contract between the parties, there would have been no accident. But, because the
Court dismissed this prong of the Montana test, there was no discussion of whether
the driver of the A-1 truck was on company business at the time of the accident.
The court should also have considered A-I's business relationship with the tribe
in its analysis of the second prong of the test. In analyzing any court's subject
matter jurisdiction, the health and safety of the forum's residents gives any state
subject matter jurisdiction over accidents within its borders. But the Strate Court
232. Id. at 446.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 453.
235. Id. at 446.
236. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565 (1981) (stating that "tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands").
237. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.
238. l&
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dismissed this concern as trivial. The Court stated, "Undoubtedly, those who drive
carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the
vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana's
second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule."239
What "more" the Court could possibly require besides protecting the safety of tribal
members is unclear, especially when safety of tribal members is defined as one of
the elements of both the Montana test and the Strate Court's "exceptions."
The Court then went on to say that requiring A-1 to "defend against this
commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court 2 41 is not
necessary to protect the Tribe's interests. 24' This statement is shocking in several
respects. First, although it is a State right-of-way, the State does not own the
underlying land. The fact remains that the highway ran through the boundaries of
the reservation. The State had no legal ownership interest in the land.24
Second, it is a complete mischaracterization to call the tribal court an
"unfamiliar court."24' 3 The fact that A-1 was doing business with the Tribe, owned
the truck and employed the driver that was involved in the accident while driving
on the reservation makes this statement absurd. If A-I had been engaged in
construction for South Dakota while being a business entity from North Dakota,
there would have been no discussion whatsoever as to unfamiliar forums if the
accident had occurred in South Dakota, regardless of whether the driver was
engaged in official company business at the time of the accident. Merely by virtue
of driving on a road running through the State of South Dakota, both the driver and
A-1 would be subject to its personal jurisdiction, and the State would have subject
matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. It is an accepted norm of modem life that being
involved in an automobile accident in a foreign state automatically gives that forum
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. This is because courts recognize that the
forum has a very strong interest in protecting the safety of its residents and of the
roadways in general. The only distinction between such cases and the situation in
Strate was that the State of North Dakota built the highway that ran through the
reservation pursuant to a right-of-way. As the Court itself pointed out, the Tribe still
certainly has an interest in protecting its tribal members from the reckless driving
of those driving on the roads running through the reservation. 244
The Court also dismissed as having little relevance the fact that the tribal police
retained the jurisdiction to patrol the road.245 This is basically an acknowledgment
239. Id. at 457-58.
240. Id. at 459.
241. Id
242. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 527 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an easement as a right to use land, not
an ownership interest in it).
243. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
244. Id.
245. Id at 455 n.l1.
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that the Tribe had a significant interest in protecting the safety of those who used
the highway running through the reservation. But, as with the other facts that ran
contrary to its conclusion, the Court dismissed the significance of this fact by
placing it in a footnote and stating that it was irrelevant without explaining why.246
In addition, a right-of-way is a form of an easement, which is a right to use
land; it is specifically not an ownership interest in the land. The federal government
still held title to the underlying land in trust for the Tribe. In order to reach its
conclusion that the tribal court had no subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the
Court focused on the fact that the State paid the Tribe compensation for the right-
of-way, and the Tribe retained only the right to erect crossings on the highway.247
But both of these issues are irrelevant when considered in light of basic property
law. In negotiating easements, it is almost always the case that the owner of land
will collect compensation for an easement. In addition, the owner will often require
the easement holder to maintain the easement and will retain for itself very few
rights for the duration of the easement. Thus, the elements that the Court used to
justify its statement that the highway should have been treated as fee land owned
by a non-Indian make no logical or legal sense.
2. Member v. Nonmember Indians After Strate
The decision in Strate also used the term "nonmember" rather than "non-
Indian" in its discussion of tribal court jurisdiction.24 This would suggest that the
Court might have intended the holding to apply equally to non-Indians and
nonmember Indians. But such a holding is in direct conflict with a recent
congressional modification of the Indian Civil Rights Act249 in which Congress
specifically overruled a Supreme Court holding that treated nonmember Indians the
same as non-Indians in a criminal context.20 Based on this legislation, it is more
likely Congress' intent to have member and nonmember Indians residing on a
reservation treated the same for civil purposes.251 In addition, treating nonmember
Indians the same as tribal members makes more sense given both the historical and
modem realities of tribal life. Members of one tribe often marry members of other
tribes and live their lives on their spouse's reservation. The children are raised in
that tribe; the nonmember spouse obtains services from Indian Health Services on
the member spouse's reservation. Thus, the line between nonmember Indians and
246. Id.
247. IdU at 455.
248. Id. at 446, 447,454.
249. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
250. Id. § 1301(2) (West Supp. 2000).
251. See supra Part IV regarding criminal jurisdiction and the statutory and case law restrictions on tribal
criminal jurisdiction. Few federal statutes and cases restrict tribal civil jurisdiction, leading to the conclusion that
Congress would probably not acknowledge tribal criminal jurisdiction that was broader than tribal civil
jurisdiction.
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member Indians residing on the same reservation is much less distinct than is the
line between nonmembers and non-Indians. Logic dictates that nonmember Indians
residing on the reservation should be treated the same as tribal members for
adjudicative purposes. 2
3. The Court's Definition of "Indian Country" in Strate
One of the most significant grounds on which the Court based its holding
involved the Court's definition of the term "Indian country." Because the accident
occurred on a right-of-way held by the State, the Court concluded that the highway
was the same for nonmember regulatory purposes as alienated non-Indian land. 2 3
The Court discussed rights-of-way in a footnote,4 merely saying,
[flor contextual treatment of rights-of-way over Indian land, compare 18
U.S.C.[A.] § 1151 [the Major Crimes Act] (defining "Indian country" in
criminal law chapter generally to include "rights-of-way running through
[a] reservation") with [18 U.S.C.A.] §§ 1154(c) and 1156 (term "Indian
country," as used in sections on dispensation and possession of intoxicants,
"does not include... rights-of-way through Indian reservations." 55
The Court appears to have cited these two inconsistent definitions of Indian
country to justify its conclusion that the State's right-of-way in Strate was
analogous to alienated non-Indian land. However, this conclusion ignores the fact
that the definition in the Major Crimes Act2 6 is the default definition of Indian
country in both the civil and criminal context.s 7 The definition of Indian country
relied on by the Court in Strate is an obscure statute that only applies to the sale and
possession of liquor in Indian country.258 By relying on the statute to justify its
conclusion that the State highway in Strate was not Indian country, the Court
contradicted its prior case law. All other cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
have used the definition of Indian country in the Major Crimes Act unless there was
252. One of the rationalizations for treating nonmember Indians and non-Indians the same is that
nonmembers generally have no voice in the tribal government. But this rationalization fails when analogized with
anyone who has two or more residences. Because they can only be registered to vote in one of their states of
residence, they necessarily have no voice in the government of the other state. But this inability to participate in
both state governments has no impact whatsoever on either state's ability to exercise its full sovereignty.
253. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997).
254. Id. at 454 n.9.
255. Id.
256. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
257. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (stating that although§ 1151 is a criminal statute, it "generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction"); see also South Dakota
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (using § 1151 in the Court's analysis of whether a landfill
constructed on non-Indian fee land was Indian country).
258. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(c), 1156 (West 1984 & Supp. 1999).
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a specific statutory definition that applied to the issue2 9 Therefore, by focusing on
the intended result rather than the potential impact of the decision, the Court left
open the possibility for other courts to "pick and choose" which definition of Indian
country suits their purpose in any given case.
4. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies After Strate
While the Court in Strate specifically held that neither National Farmers26 nor
Iowa Mutual261 applied to the case, in a footnote, the Court stated that there was no
need to exhaust tribal remedies on the issue of tribal court jurisdiction.262 In a
sweeping generalization, the Court says that "it is plain" that there is no tribal
jurisdiction in this case and that exhausting tribal remedies would merely serve to
delay the proceedings. 26 But the district court upheld tribal jurisdiction, the
appellate court affirmed tribal jurisdiction, the appellate court, en banc, reversed,
and the Supreme Court affirmed that the tribe lacked jurisdiction. In other words,
two courts held that the tribal court had jurisdiction, and two courts held that it did
not. This judicial history defies the assertion that it was "plain" that the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court potentially undermined any tribal court proceeding to
determine its subject matter jurisdiction as delaying the proceedings. 64 But such an
inquiry is a critical part of the court's judicial process. If a tribal court is subject to
having its inquiry trivialized as "plain" and a means of delaying the process, the
concept of exhaustion of tribal remedies will become a tool by which district court
judges can make the holdings in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual meaningless.
C. Potential Ramifications of Strate
The Supreme Court clearly meant the holding in Strate to apply only when a
tribal member was not a party to the action. For example, prior to analyzing the
Montana "exceptions," the Court noted that the accident occurred between two non-
Indians.25 The Court went on to discuss whether such an accident jeopardizes the
259. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(10) (West 1983), includes its own
definition of Indian country that is slightly different from the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
But this definition applies only to ICWA cases, and the Supreme Court has never attempted to use this definition
in any other context.
Also, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2721 (West Supp. 2000), has a very
expansive definition of "Indian lands" that applies only for purposes of Indian gaming. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(4)
(West Supp. 2000).
260. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
261. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
262. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,459 n.14 (1997).
263. Id
264. Id
265. Id. at 456.
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"political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare" of the Tribe26
(that is, whether Montana's second "exception" had been met). In concluding that
the accident had not affected the Tribe's interests enough to allow it to have
jurisdiction over the case, the Court specifically distinguished between the potential
of injury to a tribal member and the actual injury of a tribal member.267 The Court
states, "if Montana's second exception requires no more [than a potential for injury
to a tribal member], the exception would severely shrink the rule."263
But the Court's holding in Strate rested mainly on the characterization of the
land on which the accident occurred. Instead of focusing on the threat that negligent
drivers pose to the safety of tribal members, the Court based its reasoning on a
strained definition of Indian country. The Court concluded that the right-of-way
where the accident had occurred should be treated as alienated fee land. 69 Thus,
because the accident had involved only nonmembers, and, for analytical purposes,
the land was non-Indian-owned fee land, the Court concluded that the Tribe had no
interest in the accident.
The Court's analysis in Strate left the door open for other courts to deny the
tribes jurisdiction even in cases involving tribal members. In fact, two cases out of
the Ninth Circuit recently used the Supreme Court's reasoning to circumvent tribal
court jurisdiction in tort actions involving injuries to tribal members. The appellate
court in Wilson v. Marchington' concluded, despite the fact that the accident
involved a tribal member, "this case mirrors the facts of Strate almost precisely."271
Focusing solely on the characterization of the highway as alienated fee land, the
Wilson court held that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
case.272 The Tribe's interest in the safety of its members, which in the Wilson case
is no longer theoretical, was summarily dismissed by the Ninth Circuit. The Wilson
court stated that "[i]f the possibility of injuring multiple tribal members does not
satisfy the second Montana exception under Strate, then, perforce, Wilson's status
as a tribal member alone cannot."2 73 The Ninth Circuit took the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the possibility of injury to tribal members was insufficient to
implicate tribal interests and applied it to a situation in which there had been actual
injury to a tribal member.
But there are several flaws in the court's logic in Wilson. First, the facts of this
case did not mirror those in Strate. As noted above, the Supreme Court began its
analysis by observing that no tribal members had been involved in the accident. 7 4
266. Id. at 457.
267. Id. at 458.
268. Id.
269. la at 454.
270. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
271. Id. at 814.
272. Id. at 814-15.
273. Id. at 815.
274. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,456 (1997).
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It is upon this fact that the Court in Strate based its conclusion that the tribe had no
interest in the case. Second, the Wilson court failed to recognize the obvious
difference between the possibility of injury and the fact of injury to a tribal
member. If actual physical injury to a tribal member does not constitute a threat to
"health or safety," then nothing can, and this portion of the Montana "exception"
is meaningless. Furthermore, the Wilson court focused on the application of
Montana and Strate to the tribe, not to the members.275 But linguistics and logic
dictate that the "health or safety" elements of the Montana test apply to the
individual tribal members, and not to the tribe as an entity.
Following the precedent set by the Ninth Circuit, a district court in the State of
Montana held that the Crow Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a
lawsuit filed by a tribal member against a non-Indian. 6 As in Wilson, the Austin's
Express, Inc. v. Arneson277 case involved a car accident that occurred within the
reservation boundaries but on an interstate highway right-of-way held by the state.
Noting that the "key" to the Strate holding was the Court's characterization of the
highway as alienated fee land,278 the Austin's Express court found it insignificant
to the analysis of tribal interests that the victim was a tribal member.29
But, despite the fact that the holdings in Wilson and Austin's Express fail to
recognize the significant interests of the tribes in protecting the health and safety
of their members, neither decision is surprising given the reasoning in Strate. The
Strate Court's characterization of the right-of-way through trust land as falling
outside the definition of Indian country almost makes these holdings inevitable.
D. Nature/Subject Matter of the Dispute
Certain types of civil cases have withstood challenges to tribal courtjurisdiction
based upon the infringement test set out in Williams.8 ° Those include divorce,
adoption and child custody, probate and execution of judgments against Indian
property.
1. Divorces
The tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over divorces between Indians
domiciled in Indian country."' Tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
275. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 815.
276. Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 3187 (D. Mt. 1998).
277. 25 Indian L. Rptr. 3187 (D. Mt. 1998).
278. Id. at 3188.
279. Id.
280. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959).
281. State ex rel. Stewart v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290,292 (Mt. 1980); Whyte v. District Court, 346 P.2d
1012, 1014 (Colo. 1989).
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state to grant divorces when at least one party is an Indian domiciled within the
territorial jurisdiction of the tribal court.282 Tribal codes vary in the manner in which
they assert such jurisdiction, sometimes basing jurisdiction on the domicile and
Indian status of the plaintiff, sometimes on service of process and the Indian status
of the defendant. In some cases, this results in the tribe exercising less power than
it could (for instance, a court may refuse to take jurisdiction over a divorce sought
by a resident Indian plaintiff against an absent Indian or non-Indian defendant). It
can also lead to conflicting judgments between state and tribal courts if one of the
parties files the suit in tribal court and the other files in state court. Currently, there
are no requirements for full faith and credit between tribal and state courts.
Therefore, unless the tribe and state have an agreement based on comity, there is
a potential for conflicting judgments.23
2. Adoption and Child Custody
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978214 provides that tribal courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters involving Indian children residing or
domiciled on the tribe's reservation, and nonexclusive but preferential jurisdiction
over such matters involving Indian children living off the reservation.285
3. Probate Cases
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to probate non-trust assets of Indians
who die domiciled within the tribal court's territorial jurisdiction.286 A tribal court
probably has exclusive jurisdiction to probate non-trust assets located within the
court's jurisdiction, even if the deceased Indian had been domiciled outside of
Indian country.m The principal authority for this is the specific language in
Williams v. Lee288 because inheritance is one of the most customary and traditional
aspects of tribal law. The probate of trust assets must be accomplished through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
2 89
282. Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Hunt v. Hunt, 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6039 (Ft.
McDermitt Tribal Ct. 1988).
283. See infra Part XI (regarding "Conflict of Laws").
284. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
285. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). ICWA is a complicated statute, and a full discussion
of its jurisdictional implications is beyond the scope of this Article.
286. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). The Bureau of Indian Affairs has exclusive
jurisdiction to probate trust assets of tribal members because it is the administrative agency under the Department
of the Interior responsible for administering Indian trust assets.
287. This analysis is based on the concept of in rem jurisdiction.
288. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
289. This is because the federal government is the legal title holder of all tribal trust property.
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4. Execution of Judgments on Indian Property
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce judgments by execution on
Indian property located within Indian country.2e Even in P.L. 280 states, only the
tribe or the federal government can do any act that would result in the encumbrance,
alienation or taxation of Indian property.291
5. Land Issues
The first fact that a court must ascertain is the exact status of the land. The court
must determine whether the land is within the reservation boundaries or outside;
whether the land is "open" or "closed";292 whether the land is held in fee or trust;
and whether the land is owned by a tribal member, nonmember Indian or non-
Indian. The answer to each of these inquiries influences the tribe's subject matter
jurisdiction over the property.
If the land is held in trust by the federal government for a tribal member or the
tribe itself, then the tribal court and federal court have concurrent jurisdiction. This
is because disputes involving Indian land held by the federal government in trust
is by definition a federal question conferring subject matter jurisdiction on federal
district courts. 293 This is true in both P.L. 280294 and non-P.L. 280 states.
If the land is within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, the only clear
jurisdictional rules are: (1) the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to zone "closed"
areas, whether fee or trust, and whether held by an Indian or non-Indian owner; and
(2) the tribe has no jurisdiction to zone "open-area" fee land owned by a non-
Indian.29 These rules come from Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Nation,2'e in which the only portions of the decision that garnered a
majority are those listed above. A "closed" area is a portion of the reservation that
is closed to all but tribal members; an "open" area includes any part of the
reservation to which the tribe allows nonmembers access. Because Brendale
involved a tribe's regulatory authority (e.g., its right to regulate land use through
zoning ordinances), it demarcates the outside limits of a tribe's adjudicatory
290. Joe v. Marcum 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
291. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 1993).
292. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 411-12
(1989) (defining "open" as areas within the reservation owned by a large number of nonmembers and "closed"
as the areas in which the Tribe has retained the right to exclude nonmembers).
293. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661
(1974) (holding that land claimed pursuant to a treaty is also a federal question).
294. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 1993).
295. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 411-12.
296. Id. at 408.
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authority as well.297 If the land is trust land held by the tribe or a tribal member, it
would likely fall within both the Montana29' and Strate29 tests described above.
That is, any disputes involving the land would almost certainly be considered
crucial to the tribe's economic security and political integrity.
The tougher questions involve land held in fee by a tribe, a tribal member or a
nonmember Indian. The jurisdictional resolution would depend on what affect the
outcome of the litigation might have on the tribe.3° A dispute involving land held
by the tribe itself would be the most likely to implicate the political integrity or
economic security of the tribe.301 In contrast, land held in fee by a non-Indian has
been held to be subject to local non-tribal zoning ordinances.0 Whether tribes have
regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction over land held in fee by a nonmember Indian
would require a close analysis of the Montana and Strate factors.
6. Commercial Transactions
The initial inquiries for determining which court has adjudicatory authority over
commercial transactions (e.g., contract disputes) include who the parties to the
transaction are;303 whether an Indian party is the plaintiff or defendant; 304 where the
contract was negotiated; 3 5 where the contract was executed (signed);3 6 where the
majority of the terms of the contract were to be performed;30 whether there were
any forum selection provisions in the contract; 3 and where the parties to the
contract were domiciled, or state of incorporation and principal place of business
for corporations.3°
Once the court ascertains these facts, it would begin its analysis based on the
status of the parties and the tribal code. If both parties are tribal members, the tribal
court would have the fullest jurisdiction allowed by the tribal code. If the plaintiff
is a tribal member and the defendant is a non-Indian, the court would apply the
297. See Strate v.A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that a tribe's adjudicatory authority cannot
exceed its regulatory authority).
298. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
299. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
300. Id.
301. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 1993) (conferring on the federal district courts original jurisdiction over
civil actions brought by tribes where the matter "arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States").
302. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
303. See supra Part IX.A (discussing the tests to determine tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, depending
on whether the parties are tribal members, nonmember Indians or non-Indians).
304. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Williams310 test. The court would apply the Williams or MontanalStrate3tt analysis
if both parties are nonmembers, depending on whether the contract was negotiated,
performed or executed in Indian country.
7. Personal Injury
The relevant inquiries for resolving jurisdictional disputes for personal injury
cases (e.g., auto accidents) include where the injury occurred;312 where the conduct
causing the injury occurred (if different from where the injury occurred, as in a
products liability case);313 whether the party is a tribal member, nonmember Indian
or non-Indian;314 whether the Indian party is the plaintiff or defendant;315 and where
the parties are domiciled, or place of incorporation and principal place of business
of corporation. 6 The analysis would be the same as in a commercial transaction,
which is discussed above. 7
8. Gaming
Because Indian lands are held in trust by the federal government, they are not
subject to the regulatory laws of the states in which they sit,3 8 even in PL. 280319
states. The tribes have attempted to use this unique status to develop their
reservation economies. Until recently, most of these efforts have been thwarted by
the states, which resent the fact that they lack the authority to tax reservation
income earned by tribal members 2.3 But the United States Supreme Court upheld
the tribes' right to run gaming facilities on the reservation in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians.321 The issue in Cabazon was whether the Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians could conduct certain games that were regulated in the State of
California. The Court held that, because the State merely regulated the type of
gaming at issue, but did not outlaw it completely, it was not against the State's
310. See supra text accompanying notes 221-24 (setting forth the Williams test).
311. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
312. RESATEMENT, supra note 305, §§ 145(2)(a), 146. The court would also apply the Williams (Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)) infringement test or the Strate (Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997))





317. See supra Part IX.D.6.
318. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
319. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1162 (West 1984), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993)).
320. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
321. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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public policy to allow those games. 322 Because the State could not enforce its
regulatory laws within the reservation, the Tribe could legally conduct the gaming
operations without being subject to the State's control, even in California, which
is a P.L. 280 state.3
In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA)324 in 1988. Congress adopted much of Cabazon's language
in the Act, which states: "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by
Federal law and is conducted within a state which does not, as a matter of criminal
law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.' ' 25 The state's public policy
seems to be the main focus when determining whether the tribal gaming will be
allowed.
IGRA also divides gaming into three classes. Class I is defined as the "social
gaming," including traditional games and games with nominal prizes.326 Class II
basically consists of non-electronic games that are not played against the "house. 327
If the state permits "such gaming" and it is not prohibited by federal law, then the
tribe can conduct Class II gaming. Class III gaming includes games played against
the house when the games are permitted by the state and are not prohibited by
federal law.3 28 It also consists of all electronic games.3 29 This is the category that
requires a compact between the tribes and the states.
The language of IGRA is far from clear. One of the most contested issues is
what is meant by the language "such gaming ' 330 in the provision that says the states
must negotiate with the tribes if the state "permits such gaming. 3 The question
is how specifically to interpret the phrase "such gaming." In the case of Rumsey
Indian Rancheria v. Wilson,332 the Ninth Circuit interpreted this language very
narrowly, holding that the tribal games must be identical to the ones allowed by the
state. But the dissent to the denial of rehearing articulated the other side of the
argument, which is the broad interpretation of the term. 3 According to the dissent,
the better interpretation is to allow any games that fall within any class not
prohibited by the state.334
322. Id. at 206.
323. Id. at 221-22.
324. 25 US.C.A. §§ 2701-2721 (%Vest Supp. 2000).
325. I1& § 2701(5) (West Supp. 2000).
326. Id. § 2703(6) (West Supp. 2000).
327. Id. §§ 2703(7)(A)(1), 2703(8) (West Supp. 2000).
328. Id. § 2703(8).
329. !d.
330. Id. § 2710(dXl)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
331. fid (emphasis added).
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Another problem with IGRA is the inability to enforce the provision that
requires the states to negotiate compacts with the tribes "in good faith." '335 The
Supreme Court held that the tribes could not sue the states in federal court for
failure to negotiate in good faith because such suits violate the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution.336 According to the Court, the states have sovereign
immunity from such suits unless they consent.37 Although IGRA is still valid, the
tribes have no way to enforce the "good faith" negotiation provision.
1021
335. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d).
336. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996); see U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
337. Id.
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X. PUBLIC LAW 280
Public Law 83-280 (P.L. 280)338 is a federal statute that transferred jurisdiction
over all criminal matters "committed by or against Indians in Indian country" from
the federal government to six states. 39 These states are known as the "mandatory
states" because they had no choice but to take the jurisdiction pursuant to the
statute; P.L. 280 also provided for other states to assume jurisdiction if certain
requirements were met. The Act was later amended to require tribal consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the states,3  but did not allow tribes to initiate the
338. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280,67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.,
§ 1162 (West 1984), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993)).
The civil portion reads:
State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties.
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action
between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed
opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes
of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within
the State:
State of Indian country affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State
California All Indian country within the State
Minnesota All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska All Indian country within the State
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except the Warm Springs Reservation
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner
inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise,
the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or
community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any
applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the datermination of civil causes of
action pursuant to this section.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993).
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of Public Law 280, see Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975). For a detailed
analysis of the statute, see CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND
PUBuC LAw 280 (1997).
339. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (West 1984).
340. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1322 (West 1983).
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retrocession process4 The "criminal" portion of PL. 280 was enacted to fill the
jurisdictional gap that existed at the time.342 When P.L. 280 was enacted, the federal
government would only come on to a reservation to investigate one of the "major"
crimes, that is, crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act.34 The tribes had
exclusivejurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in Indian country that were
not one of the "major crimes."3" But many smaller tribes lacked dispute resolution
systems, usually because the traditional system had been abolished by the federal
government and the tribe did not have the resources to have a BIA-approved court.
Thus, if a crime such as assault, battery, any attempt crime (i.e., attempted rape),
trespass or disturbing the peace occurred on the reservation, there was no legal
recourse for the victim in the federal system.
Although the congressional intent with respect to this criminal portion of P.L.
280 was based on a legitimate concern that many victims lacked legal recourse
under the federal system,345 the enactment of P.L. 280 increased the tension between
the tribes and the states; the tribes resented the state's exercise of jurisdiction in
their territories, and the "mandatory" states received no money to pay for the
enforcement expenses.3" The "real world" result of the statute was often to increase
the jurisdictional gap that existed on the smaller reservations. Because the states
were only given enforcement power without the corresponding regulatory or taxing
authority, for anything short of murder, the response time of local law enforcement
officials in California was at least three days. 47
In addition to transferring most of the criminal jurisdiction, P.L. 280 also
transferred jurisdiction from the federal government to the specified states over
some civil matters.3" The "civil" section of P.L. 280 was added at the last minute
and was more related to the federal government's attempt to assimilate Indians at
the time than with serving any legitimate purpose. 349 It allowed the state to assert
civil jurisdiction, but just how much is very unclear from either the language or
341. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1405, 1409 (1997) (stating that "[b]rute force rather than negotiations among
governments was the model for Public Law 280").
342. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162; see also Goldberg, supra note 338.
343. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1999).
344. See supra Part TV.
345. For a criticism of the argument of "lawlessness" that existed in Indian country, see generally
GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 338. "Since the earliest years of European contact, non-Indian commentaries
on tribal life have abounded in misconceptions about the existence and nature of tribal legal systems. Because
tribal systems look and function so differently from non-Indian systems, the outsiders often concluded there was
no law at all." Id. at 1410-11.
346. See id at 1416 (noting that states historically resented the special rights and status of the tribes, and
P.L. 280 "empowered an often hostile force"--e.g., the states).
347. Id. at 1426. Sheriffs cite remoteness of reservation, cultural differences and uncertainties regarding
jurisdiction as the reasons for the delays. Id.
348. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1993).
349. Goldberg, supra note 338, at 543.
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legislative history of the statute.35 In addition, the language of the statute itself
created jurisdictional gaps. For example, if there is a dispute that affects title to
Indian land, then the federal government and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction.
Thus, state courts cannot hear disputes in such cases.35's In a situation where a tribe
lacks a tribal code, constitution and formal justice system, then the only forum for
resolving the dispute is federal district court." 2 But to say the federal officials are
slow to act in such disputes is an understatement. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose cites
a typical situation in her recent law review article.353 In her article, she recounts a
dispute that arose when an Indian allottee at Torres-Martinez Reservation in
Southern California leased land for use as a dumping facility.3 4 The tribal council
passed a resolution opposing the facility, but the Tribe lacked the enforcement
capability to stop the project. The Tribe eventually obtained two cease and desist
orders from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. However, the Bureau made no effort to
enforce either order because of it's belief that the Tribe was divided on the issue. 5
To best understand P.L. 280, it is helpful to break the statute down and examine
each of its major parts. Briefly, the civil provision of P.L. 280 is divided into three
sections, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (a), (b) and (c). Section 1360(a) grants jurisdiction
over civil causes of action "to which Indians are parties" 356 that arise in Indian
country within the state "to the same extent that such State... has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action." 357 This section also provides that state laws of "general
application" will apply to Indian reservations in the state in the same manner that
those statutes apply to the rest of the state. 58 Courts have interpreted this latter
provision to exclude Indian lands from local regulations, such as zoning, rent
control and gambling.3 59
350. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976) (stating that, in "marked contrast" to the extensive
legislative history of the criminal provision of P.L. 280, there was a "virtual absence" of congressional intent in
enacting the civil provision).
351. Owens Valley Indian Housing Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999). In this case, the court
held that the federal district court lacked subject matterjurisdiction to hear the case because there was no federal
question and the state court lacked jurisdiction to hear it because of the federal statute, EL. 280 (28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1360(c) (West 1993)). Since the tribe had no court, there was no forum for the Tribal Housing Authority's
unlawful detainer action. It should be noted that this opinion was withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1330 due to mootness
because the defendant, Gifford Turner, died while the action was pending. The reasoning, however, is still a valid
reflection of how the Ninth Circuit will decide such a case when it comes before them in the future.
352. Id.
353. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 341, at 1421-23.
354. Id.
355. i
356. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(a) (West 1993).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that state gambling laws
did not apply to reservations where the games at issue did not violate the state's public policy); Segundo v. City
of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that EL. 280 does not subject Indian country
to local rent control ordinances because, "[u]nlike the field of taxation, where the laws of both the State and Tribe
may be enforced simultaneously, the cities' rent control ordinances would necessarily preclude enforcement of
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Section 1360(b) of the civil provision of P.L. 280 specifically exempts from
state regulatory jurisdiction the sale, encumbrance or taxation of tribal lands held
in trust by the federal government.3 6 In Bryan v. Itasca County,361 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the language in this section means that states cannot even apply
their laws or enforce state court judgments in a way that would result in the
alienation, encumbrance or taxation of trust property.362 The statute also prohibits
the state from regulating the use of such trust land if the regulation is inconsistent
with any federal treaty, agreement or statute with respect to the land. 63
Section 1360(c) states that any tribal ordinances or customs of the tribe "will
be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action' 36" as
long as it is not inconsistent with any state civil law. Although this provision has
rarely been invoked, as tribes in P.L. 280 states continue developing their
infrastructures, subsection (c) will likely become more significant.
The exact scope of civil jurisdiction that P.L. 280 grants to the states has been
the subject of extensive debate and judicial consideration since the statute was
enacted in 1953. There are two separate debates that arose as a result of the
ambiguous language and sparse legislative history of the civil provision of P.L.
280.
36s The first issue involves the type of jurisdiction that P.L. 280 confers. The
U.S. Supreme Court in Bryan held that the statute granted states only the right to
adjudicate private civil disputes between Indians on the reservation, not the right
to regulate reservation activities.3 The second area of contention revolves around
the question of which state laws apply to tribes and tribal members; that is, what is
the exact meaning of the term "laws of general application"367 described in the
statute. The only guidance the Supreme Court has given on this issue was in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.3s The Court held that P.L. 280
states have "criminal/prohibitory" jurisdiction, while the tribes maintain
"civil/regulatory" authority over Indians in Indian country.369 Since the Cabazon
decision, the P.L. 280 states and the tribes within those states have litigated
a conflicting ordinance enacted by the Tribe, and would 'effectively nullify' the Tribe's authority to regulate the
use of its lands" (citation omitted)); Zachary v. Wilk, 173 Cal. App. 3d 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that
a rent control ordinance could not be enforced on the reservation regardless of whether the tenants were non-
Indian); see also Goldberg, supra note 338, at 582-83 (stating that the likely interpretation of the phrase "laws of
general application" is statewide laws).
360. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 1993).
361. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
362. Id. at 391.
363. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b).
364. Id. § 1360(c) (West 1993).
365. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383.
366. Id at 384-85.
367. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(a) (West 1993).
368. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
369. Id. at 213-14.
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extensively over the issue of what constitutes "civil/regulatory" versus
"criminal/prohibitory."
The ambiguity in the language of P.L. 280 has also created choice of law issues
with which the tribes and states continue to struggle. Section 1360(c) of the statute
states:
Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an
Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it
may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the
State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of
action pursuant to this section. 7°
Potentially this means that, if a tribal law on point exists and that law is not
inconsistent with the state law, then tribal law must be applied in a civil dispute. In
addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that P.L. 280 did not divest tribes of
jurisdiction; it merely granted the state and tribal governments concurrent
jurisdiction.37' The Venetie court also held that P.L. 280 did not prevent tribes from
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the State of Alaska, as all jurisdictional
ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the tribes.372 Because the statute says that
state courts shall apply tribal laws that are not inconsistent, the question is: in what
circumstances must tribal law be applied? The focus of the inquiry, then, is on
which tribal laws are inconsistent with state laws. The statute gives no guidance on
the proper interpretation of the meaning of "inconsistent laws." Is it enough that a
tribal law is inconsistent with the public policy behind the state's law? Or if the law
370. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(c) (West 1993).
371. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560-62 (9th Cir. 1991); see Id. at
561 (stating that the Supreme Court has not interpreted P.L. 280 as a divestiture statute and has "rejected all
interpretations of Public Law 280 which would result in an undermining or destruction of tribal governments").
372. Id.; see also AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 104, at 144 n.120 (stating
Compare Becker County Welfare Dept. v. Bellcourt, 453 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's claim that state agency could not bring action to determine paternity and stating
that, "[w]hile chapter 256 of Minnesota Statutes regarding AFDC does contain some regulatory
aspects, in a paternity action, the county is only acting on behalf of a private party who has assigned
her rights to establish paternity and recover child support"), with State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services
v. Whitebreast, 409 N..2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1987) (concluding that Public Law 280 jurisdiction did
not authorize action by state agency to recover aid to dependent family payments, since "the public
character of the Child Support Recovery Unit ... seems to us unescapable'); see also United States
v. County of Humboldt, 615 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (ruling that P.L. 280 did not authorize
application of county zoning and building codes against Indian construction projects on tribal trust
lands); State v. Lemieux, 317 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Wis. CL App. 1982) (Public Law 280 grant of civil
jurisdiction insufficient to allow enforcement of statutory prohibition against possession of uncased
or loaded firearms in vehicles against on-reservation activity of tribal members); see generally
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L.
Rev. 535, 576-80 (1976) (discussing the difficulty in determining the precise scope of state substantive
civil law authorized to be applied under Public Law 280).
1026
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
of the two sovereigns are only partially inconsistent, must the court apply the
portion of tribal law that is not inconsistent? And it is not clear whether the state
court has an affirmative duty to discover the tribal law or whether the burden is on
the parties to inform the court of the tribal law.
Another area of ambiguity that exists regarding the interpretation of P.L. 280
involves whether the tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction over all matters covered
by the statute. One argument is that the statute merely transfers the federal
jurisdiction to the state without divesting the tribes of any criminal or civil
jurisdiction. According to David Getches, one of the foremost Indian law scholars,
nothing in P.L. 280 divests the tribes of concurrent jurisdiction with the state; the
tribal criminal jurisdiction survived such that the tribes can punish tribal members
for violations of tribal law.373 According to Getches, tribes also retained their full
civil jurisdiction.374 This is because P.L. 280 addresses the shift between the state
and federal jurisdiction, not tribal jurisdiction. The only additional restriction on
tribal authority that P.L. 280 imposes involves the choice of law when the tribal law
is inconsistent with the state law in civil matters.375 Otherwise, the tribes in P.L. 280
states retain their full jurisdiction, subject only to the same restrictions over non-
Indians or non-Indian land,376 discussed above.
But not all courts agree with Professor Getches' interpretation of the statute.3"
These courts, most notably Alaska state courts, view P.L. 280 as completely
divesting tribal courts of jurisdiction, even in Indian Child Welfare Act3 71 cases.
As tribal courts continue to develop, theses ambiguities will increasingly be an
area of tension between the tribes and the states. Court rules should be developed
by the tribes and states in order to address these jurisdictional issues.379
373. GErcHF-s Er AL, supra note 121, at 504 n.2.
374. Id.; see also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 341, at 1416 (noting that "no mention was made [in P.L.
280] of tribal authority").
375. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(c) (West 1993).
376. GErCHES Er AL, supra note 121, at 504 n.2.
377. For example, despite the clear intent of Congress in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to expand
tribal court jurisdiction over matters involving the custody of Indian children, the Supreme Court of Alaska has
consistently held that the Native Villages lack any jurisdiction, concurrent or otherwise, over ICWA matters unless
the Village has specifically petitioned for and been granted jurisdiction under the Act. See, e.g., Native Village
of Nenana v. Alaska, 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986); In re K.E., 744 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1987); In re F.P., 843 P.2d
1214 (Alaska 1992). Other courts and commentators have read the reassumption provision to mean that a tribe
is required to reassume jurisdiction only where a tribe in a P.L. 280 state wants exclusive jurisdiction, which is
the correct interpretation in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(holding that the purpose of the civil section of P.L. 280 was to provide a forum for the resolution of civil disputes
arising in Indian country where such a forum was lacking). Id. at 383. Therefore, where the tribe has the ability
to adjudicate the matter, there is no basis in law or policy to prevent concurrent jurisdiction between the tribe and
state.
378. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
379. For further discussion, see infra Part XII.D.
1027
2000 / Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
XI. CONFLICT OF LAWS ISSUES
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Who Can Hear the Case v. Who Should Hear the
Case
The court in which a lawsuit is filed is called the forum court. The forum court
must determine whether it has personal, subject matter and territorial jurisdiction
over each case that comes before it. If the forum court determines that it has all of
these elements, but another jurisdiction does as well, then the court must decide
which jurisdiction is most appropriate for the resolution of the dispute and what law
it should apply.38 0 A modem conflict of laws analysis focuses on two basic factors:
which jurisdiction "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties,' 3 t and which jurisdiction has the most significant interest in the outcome
of the dispute. 2 Detailed below are factors set out by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws 3 3 that are helpful in determining which jurisdiction should hear
the case.
The discussion focuses on three of the most common types of suits that create
conflict issues between tribal and state courts: land disputes, personal injury cases,
and commercial transaction suits. However, the basic analysis can be applied to any
conflict of laws situation. While most courts have not yet applied this conflicts
analysis when there is a situation in which the state and a tribe have concurrent
jurisdiction, it is included here because it provides a logical and fair way to
determine which court should hear a case when more than one court can hear the
case. In addition, the Restatement analysis is one of the most widely accepted
procedure for dealing with conflicts issues that arise when any two forums can hear
a case. This includes state/state, state/federal, or United States/foreign country
conflicts.
1. Land Issues
Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,38' the single
determinative factor for deciding which forum should hear a case involving real
property is the location of the land .3  Thus, if the Restatement were applied to
380. In the context of Indian law, the issue of choice of law rarely arises. The common issue that arises is
which court--tribal or state (or which of two tribal courts)-should or can hear a case where there is concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. Although the factors used in this section generally determine "choice of law," they
are also useful in analyzing "choice of forum."
381. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, § 145.
382. MAURICEROSENBERG Er AL, CONmiCTOFLAWS, CASES AND MATR1ALS 513 (10th ed. 1996) (citing
Professor Brainerd Currie's theory).
383. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, § 145.
384. Id. §§ 222-231.
385. See iU. (stating that the law of the court where the land is located should be applied).
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resolve issues involving land disputes within the reservation boundaries, the tribal
court would always be the appropriate forum. Who owned the property or how title
was held would be irrelevant under the Restatement view. This view makes the
most sense because the tribe has the most significant interest in the outcome of any
disputes involving land within the reservation boundaries. For example, it is
universally recognized in this country that a state has the exclusive right to
determine matters involving any real property located within its borders. This is
true regardless of where the underlying case arose, as in a divorce action or probate
matter. In either of these cases, the couple or decedent might own land located in
a state other than the one in which the underlying case was filed.
386
Unfortunately, Indian law has not developed in such a neat fashion, and the
tribe's adjudicatory authority rests on the inquiries mentioned above, such as
whether the land is held in fee or trust and whether the owner is a tribal member.87
2. Personal Injury Cases
Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 388 the most important
factor in determining the best forum for adjudicating personal injury lawsuits is the
site of the injury.389 Other factors to consider include the domicile and residence of
the parties;390 where the injury-causing conduct occurred,391 if different from the site
of the injury; and the place in which the relationship between the parties, if any, is
centered.392 In the case of a products liability action, where the item was
purchased 93 and where the retailer advertised39 are also relevant factors to the
inquiry. As with all discussions of tribal jurisdiction, the legal status of the parties
is crucial as well. The court must determine if the parties are tribal members,
nonmember Indians or non-Indians. In addition, whether the tribe can exercise
jurisdiction over these cases should be detailed in the tribe's law and order code.
386. The practical reason for this development is that enforcement of ajudgment against land in a different
jurisdiction is difficult.
387. See supra Part VII (discussing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country).
388. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, §§ 145-146.
389. Id § 145(2)(a).
390. Id. § 145(2)(c).
391. Id. § 145(2)(b).
392. Id. § 145(2)(d).
393. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). This case involves a
personal jurisdiction analysis, but because it comes down to looking at the contacts with the forum and fairness
to the parties, the basic policies underlying the analysis are similar to the Restatement analysis (which examines
the extent of the relationship with the forum and the forum's interest in the outcome).
394. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (including in its analysis of what constitutes
"minimum contacts" solicitation of business in the forum).
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Once this is determined, the court looks at the tests in Williams39 (the right of
tribes to make their own laws and be governed by them), and in Montana39 6 and
Strate397 (whether there is a consensual relationship between the tribe or tribal
member and the other party, and whether the resolution of the suit affects the
political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of the tribe).3 98 The
Restatement factors described above are particularly helpful in determining the
tribe's interest.
3. Commercial Transaction Cases
If there is no provision in the contract for the selection of the forum, then the
Restatement sets out the following factors for deciding which jurisdiction has the
greatest interest in the transaction. These factors include the place of contracting,399
the place of negotiating the contract,w the place of performance of the contract,40'
the location of the subject matter of the contract' m and the domicile, residence,
place of incorporation and principal place of business of the parties.403 The specific
application to Indian law must also include the determination of whether the parties
are tribal members, nonmember Indians or non-Indians. Again, the Williams4  test
(the right of tribes to make their own laws and be governed by them) and the
Montana4 5 and Strate4w tests (whether there is a consensual relationship between
the tribe or tribal member and the other party; whether the resolution of the suit
affects the political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of the tribe)417
must then be applied to the analysis. The use of the Restatement factors can be
helpful in the court's analysis.
4. Considerations of Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens basically applies to cases where the court
has personal, territorial and subject matter jurisdiction, but the forum is so
inconvenient that the court declines to exercise its jurisdiction. This analysis
395. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
396. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
397. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
398. Id.
399. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, § 188(2)(a).
400. Id § 188(2)(b).
401. IcL § 188(2)(c).
402. Id. § 188(2)(d).
403. Id. § 188(2)(e).
404. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
405. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
406. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
407. Id.
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depends on the availability of an alternate forum.408 For example, a car accident
may occur inside the boundaries of the reservation, and the driver of one car sues
the other driver for his injuries. The plaintiff is a non-Indian and lives off the
reservation, so he files the suit in state court. However, the defendant, who is also
a non-Indian, and all of the witnesses live on the reservation, and the accident
occurred there. It would be time-consuming and expensive to require all of the
parties to go to the state court to litigate the dispute, so, providing there is a tribal
forum available, the state court should dismiss the case on the basis of forum non
conveniens.
Under a traditional conflict of laws analysis, the factors to consider in a forum
non conveniens discussion are divided into two categories: private and public. The
private factors are those factors that only affect the particular parties or
jurisdictions. They include access to proof, ability to serve process on the parties
and witnesses, cost of getting witnesses to the litigation, access to the site if that is
necessary, and the ability to enforce the judgment that the forum renders.4 The
public factors include administrative difficulties, such as congestion of the courts,
the local interest in having a local controversy resolved there, the financial burden
on the forum if it hears the case, and the application of foreign law if the forum's
law does not apply.410
B. Choice of Law: Whose Law Should Apply
It should be noted at the outset that there are two types of law that a forum must
apply: procedural and substantive. Procedural law refers to the rules governing how
a case will proceed. For example, procedural laws determine the size of paper to be
used, the time for filing and serving papers, how discovery is to be conducted, just
to name a few. In contrast, substantive law refers to the law that governs the dispute
itself. For instance, if it is a car accident, the substantive law applied by the court
determines if there are any caps on damages. The distinction between these two
types of law is important because the forum always applies its own procedural laws,
but it can decide to apply another jurisdiction's substantive law if it determines that
the other jurisdiction has a stronger relationship to the parties or interest in the
outcome.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,4 the factors a court
should consider when deciding which substantive law to apply are as follows: the
408. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, § 84.
409. Id. § 84 cmt. c; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
410. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09. Note that the term "foreign" simply means a jurisdiction other than the
forum; it does not mean foreign in the international sense.
411. RESTATEMENT, supra note 305, § 6.
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needs of the system (need for uniformity in the area of law);4 2 the relevant policies
of each forum; 413 the protection of justified expectations of the parties;414 the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law;415 "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result"; 41 6 and the ease in determining and applying the appropriate
law.4 1
7
1. Need for Uniformity in Indian Law
Any commentator on Indian law will agree that this area of law is one of the
most inconsistent in ourjudicial system. Application of tribal, state and federal law
in a haphazard manner only adds to this confusion. As the Supreme Court
recognized in National Farmers41 and Iowa Mutual,4 9 tribal forums should be
utilized whenever possible in disputes arising in Indian country. And applying tribal
law to disputes that arise in Indian country will prevent parties from avoiding tribal
law by "forum shopping" in state courts.
2. Polices of Each Potential Forum
In deciding whose law should apply, the court should consider the policies of
each jurisdiction. For example, if an auto accident occurs between a tribal member
and non-Indian, and the action is filed in tribal court, the tribe may have certain
caps on damages. This is one of the greatest areas of dispute in policy between
tribal courts and state courts. The tribe has a significant interest in protecting the
limited financial resources of the tribe and its members while the state has a
significant interest in allowing its residents to obtain the greatest compensation
possible for injuries they sustain. Tribes also have a strong interest in exercising
their sovereignty because the state and federal governments have often taken a "use
it or lose it" attitude with respect to the tribes.42° In addition, tribes have a
significant interest in maintaining their culture and traditions. Applying state laws
412. See id. § 6 cmt. d ("Probably the most important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the
interstate and international systems work well.").
413. IM. § 6(2)(b).
414. Id. § 6(2)(d).
415. Id. § 6(2)Ce).
416. Id. § 6(2)(0.
417. Id. § 6(2)(g).
418. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
419. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
420. States often have asserted jurisdiction even when they clearly lck it if they perceive that the tribe is
not exercising its jurisdiction. The federal government has followed the same path, as evidenced by the enactment
of P.L. 280 due to a perceived "lawlessness" in Indian country.
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to disputes in Indian country would seriously undermine these efforts.42' And any
judgment obtained in state court would be unenforceable against property owned
by a tribal member that. is located on the reservation, rendering the state court
judgment moot.42 In contrast, if the accident were to occur outside the reservation
boundaries or involved a contract dispute where all parties had equal connections
to both jurisdictions, application of state law may be more appropriate.
3. Protection of Justified Expectations
One goal of any justice system is to protect the justified expectations of those
who live and transact business in the forum. For instance, in a contract case
involving a tribe or tribal member and non-Indian entity where the terms of the
contract were to be performed in Indian country, the Indian parties would have a
justified expectation that tribal law would be applied to the resolution of the
dispute, unless the contract specifically stated otherwise.4 3 It might still be
appropriate to apply tribal law even when the contract states otherwise if the
contract is a "form" contract, rather than one negotiated specifically by the
parties.424 Application of state law might be more appropriate where the parties
entered into the contract off the reservation, even if the suit were filed in tribal
court.
4. Policies Underlying the Law
The policies underlying federal Indian law in general are to encourage self-
determination and financial independence from federal funds. 425 In order to
accomplish these objectives, it is important to give effect to tribal law whenever
possible. This will give non-Indians a chance to understand that their interests can
be protected by tribal law, which will in turn encourage more business relationships
between the tribes and non-Indians. The court should balance these policies of
Indian law generally with the policies underlying the specific type of case before
421. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 341, at 1411-12 (noting that the structure of traditional Indian
dispute resolution systems was usually very unfamiliar to non-Indians, or, that the tribes "went underground" with
their systems after white contact. As a result, the American government often concluded that no such system was
in place and that the Indians lived in a state of "lawlessness").
422. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that citizens of the State of Georgia
could not enter the Cherokee Nation without the consent of the Tribe); Babbit Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 710 F.2d
587 (9th Cir. 1983).
423. RFsrATEMENT, supra note 305, § 187(1).
424. Id. § 187(2). For example, if the form contained a paragraph stating that New York law would apply,
and a tribal member signed the contract in South Dakota, either on or off the reservation, the State of New York
arguably would have no interest in the dispute.
425. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); New Mexico v. Mescaterm ApacheTribe,
462 U.S. 324,334-35 (1983); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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it--e.g., real property, tort, contract, etc. In other words, tribal sovereignty should
be the "backdrop" against which courts make choice of law decisions.426
5. Certainty, Predictability and Uniformity of Results
Because federal Indian law has developed within a framework of inconsistent
federal policies toward the tribes in the past 200 years, courts should make
aggressive efforts to bring certainty, predictability and uniformity of results to this
area of law. Where a dispute arises in Indian country, application of tribal law is
one of the surest ways to promote consistency. For example, if a state court has
decided to hear a case that involves an accident within the reservation between two
non-Indian parties, applying state law creates the exact type of inconsistency that
the Restatement would seek to avoid. A state applying its own laws to such a
dispute would create an outcome very different from a dispute on the same road
involving a tribal member where that dispute was resolved using tribal law.
6. Ease in Determining and Applying the Law
This factor is the most likely to cause concern for state courts attempting to
apply tribal law. If the tribal laws are not clearly written in a tribal code, this
concern might be justifiable. But most tribes with judicial systems do have a tribal
code that is written in a form similar to the codes of any state or local government.
Also, if there is difficulty determining and applying the tribal law, this would be a
reason for the state court to defer to tribal jurisdiction if it is available. If there is
no tribal forum available and no written code, the tribe could qualify a tribal
member recognized by the tribal community as an expert to testify regarding
traditional tribal law.
XII. APPEA.S
A. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, in both federal question4 27 and
diversity42 cases filed in federal district court, the district court should, as a matter
of comity, allow the tribal court to determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. In addition, the Court has held that the litigants should
exhaust their tribal remedies in resolving this issue before filing for review of the
1034
426. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
427. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
428. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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tribal court decision in federal district court.429 The holdings stated that the
exhaustion requirement was also a matter of comity.43°
In contrast, where a suit has been filed in both state and tribal court, there are
no requirements that either stay its hand during the pendency of the litigation in the
other forum. This situation continues to result in conflicting judgments being
rendered by state and tribal courts where they have concurrent jurisdiction. Some
potential solutions to this problem are proposed below in the section entitled
"Enforceability of Judgments. 431
B. Lack of a Tribal Forum
One issue that continues to plague those involved in Indian law is what to do
when a case should be heard by the tribal court, either because the matter
particularly affects the tribal interests or because the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
as a matter of law-for instance, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act32-- but
the tribe lacks a forum in which to adjudicate the matter. Some states have simply
taken it upon themselves to hear the cases, while others refuse to do so. The former
solution solves the immediate problem of a lack of a forum. Unfortunately, it also
sets up the likelihood of future conflicts between the tribes and state if the tribe later
develops a dispute resolution system. Although refusing to adjudicate certain cases
may leave the litigants without relief, the court should consider the interests of
tribal sovereignty when deciding to hear cases over which it would otherwise lack
jurisdiction.433
XIII. ENFORCEABILITY OF JUDGMENTS
Another complicated issue facing tribal and state courts today is the ability of
a party to enforce a judgment rendered by one jurisdiction in the other
jurisdiction.4 4 This is an issue because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
429. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19.
430. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19.
431. Infra Part XIII.
432. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000).
433. See Owens Valley Indian Housing Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
an unlawful detainer action brought by a tribal housing authority against a tribal member did not present a federal
question for purposes of federal court jurisdiction and the state lacked jurisdiction because of 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1360(b) (West 1993)). As a result, the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction, despite the fact that the tribe had no tribal
court. lId It should be noted that this opinion was withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1330 due to mootness because the
defendant, Gifford Turner, died while the action was pending. The reasoning, however, is still a valid reflection
of how the Ninth Circuit will decide such a case when it comes before them in the future.
434. See, e.g., Hon. Richard E. Ransom, Hon. Christine Zuni, P.S. Deloria, Robert N. Clinton, Robert
Laurence, Nell Jessup Newton, M.E. Occhialino, Jr., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A
Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239 (1992); Robert Laurence, The
Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian
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Constitution43 does not apply between tribes and states (or tribes and the federal
government). Thus, any recognition of the other's judgments is based on one of
several grounds: (1) the concept of comity; (2) full faith and credit based on state
and/or tribal legislation or case law; (3) a written agreement between the state and
tribe to enforce each other's judgments; or (4) adoption of court rules providing for
recognition of each other's decisions. The benefits and drawbacks of each of these
solutions is discussed below.
A. Comity
Comity is the deference shown by one sovereign to the jurisdiction of another
sovereign out of respect, rather than any legal requirement to do so. Arizona and
Oregon both recognize tribal judgments as a matter of comity.436 The disadvantage
of this doctrine is that it is completely voluntary. The expectation of reciprocity is
not binding on either jurisdiction, so one sovereign may recognize the judgments
of another and find that its judgments are not reciprocally recognized.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Some states and tribes have given full faith and credit to each other's judgments
even though they are not constitutionally mandated to do so. For example, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that the Navajo Nation's decisions were entitled to full
faith and credit in New Mexico courts because the Nation was a "territory" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.437 In addition, Oklahoma and Wisconsin have
enacted statutes that require their courts to give full faith and credit to tribal court
decisions where the tribe grants reciprocity to that state's judgments.438 Certain
federal laws require full faith and credit between jurisdictions. For example, the
Violence Against Women Act,439 Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Act"' and
the Indian Child Welfare Act& ' require full faith and credit be given to orders
issued by any tribal court of competent jurisdiction.
Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589 (1990); Gorden K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions In State Courts,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985); James M. Jannetta, Reciprocity Between State and Tribal Legal Systems, 71 MICH.
B.J. 400 (1992); Robert Laurence, Service of Process and Execution ofJudgments on Indian Reservations, 10 AM.
INDiANL REv. 257 (1982).
435. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
436. The states of Arizona and Oregon recognize tribal court judgments as a matter of comity only. See, e.g.,
Leon v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566 (Ariz. 1984); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. 1975).
437. Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975).
438. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 728 (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West Supp. 1999).
439. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265 (West Supp. 2000).
440. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (West Supp. 2000).
441. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911(d) (West 1983).
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C. Written Agreements
Another way in which tribal and state courts have recognized each other's
judgments is through written agreements between the tribe(s) and state. This
solution presents some difficult issues to make it workable. For instance, the parties
to the agreement could be difficult to identify (for example, should the attorney
general or the governor sign on behalf of the state?). Also, the cost of negotiating
separate agreements for each tribe in a state such as California that has over 100
federally recognized tribes would be prohibitive.
D. Court Rules
One of the most plausible and most often recommended solutions is the
adoption of court rules by both the tribes and the states that would provide for the
recognition ofjudgments based on mandatory (full faith and credit) principles. For
example, the rules could clarify over what types of matters the state and tribal
courts had concurrent jurisdiction; in what instances one jurisdiction should defer
to the jurisdiction of the other; and in which instances the state court should apply
tribal law, or vice versa. This solution has two advantages. First, because the rules
of court have the force of law, judges and practitioners would have no choice but
to follow and apply the rules. In addition, adopting court rules would put the control
in the hands of those who must confront the complexities of working with the
jurisdictional issues on a daily basis. If the states and tribes worked together to
develop the rules, this would increase the workability and consistency among the
courts." 2 It would also increase the respect between the tribes and the states.
The California Judicial Council has taken the lead on implementing this
solution by developing forms that take into account the possibility of a tribal forum.
For example, in their domestic violence forms, there is a box to check in case the
tribe has jurisdiction over the matter. By including the tribal courts as a possible
forum, the Judicial Council has both recognized that the tribe may have exclusive
or at least concurrent jurisdiction with the state and made it easier for a party or
court to invoke the tribe's jurisdiction. It is worth noting, however, that some tribes
may reject this notion of mandatory full faith and credit due to historical
antagonism and prejudice between the tribes and nearby tribal, state or federal
governments.
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442. In fact, Joseph Myers, Executive Director of the National Indian Justice Center, is on the Access and
Fairness Committee for the California Judicial Council, which is the organization that is responsible for the
creation of standard forms used by California state courts.
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X1V. FEDERAL/TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
For a federal district court to have jurisdiction over a civil matter, the matter
must involve a "federal question" 43 or the parties must be from different states.444
Federal question jurisdiction means that the issues concern federal law or policy.
If the matter is brought by a federally recognized tribe, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1362, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over the action. If the matter
consists of interpreting a federal statute involving Indians, such as P.L. 280,445 then
the district court would have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (federal
question). But note that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims for
violations under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), except for habeas corpus
petitions.446 Even though this would appear to be a federal question, the Supreme
Court has held that allowing federal courts to hear claims of ICRA violations would
infringe too significantly on tribal sovereignty.447
In addition, it is not always clear when a matter constitutes a federal question.
For example, lower district courts in California were divided over whether unlawful
detainer actions on tribal land administered by a tribal housing authority were a
federal question; a state issue, given that California is subject to Public Law 280;
or purely a tribal matter.448 The Ninth Circuit resolved the split by holding that such
actions are like landlord/tenant disputes." 9 The court reasoned that, because it does
not involve the federal right of possession, an unlawful detainer action is not a
federal question.450 In addition, the court held that the State lacked jurisdiction
because of the land exclusion in P.L. 280.451 The tribe, therefore, had exclusive
jurisdiction to hear the matter.452
443. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993).
444. Id. § 1332 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
445. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A
§ 1162 (West 1983), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1326 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West
1993)).
446. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67-72 (1978).
447. Id. at 71.
448. See All Mission Indian Housing Auth. v. Silvas, 680 F. Supp. 330,332 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer action because it presented a federal
question); Round Valley Indian Housing Auth. v. Hunter, 907 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an unlawful detainer action because it was an
"eviction" case, which is a landlord/tenant matter and, therefore, a matter of state law).
449. Owens Valley Indian Housing Auth. v. Turner, 185 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1999). It should be noted that
this opinion was withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1330 due to mootness because the defendant, Gifford Turner, died while
the action was pending. The reasoning, however, is still a valid reflection of how the Ninth Circuit will decide
such a case when it comes before them in the future.
450. Id. at 1032.
451. Id. at 1034: see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 1993).
452. Owens Valley, 185 F.3d at 1034.
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The determination of whether a federal court has jurisdiction is a more difficult
question when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. 53 In such cases, the
plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) must be from different states to create diversity. In
addition, the district court only has jurisdiction if the courts of the state in which the
district court sits would also have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute.4m The reason for this requirement in a diversity case is that, unlike a
federal question case, the cause of action in a diversity case is based on state law.
As such, a federal court sitting in diversity acts in the place of the state court.455
Therefore, when the cause of action is based on tribal law or where all parties are
tribal members and the dispute arose on the reservation, then the tribe's right to
self-government is implicated, and the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over such a
matter.45 6 For instance, an accident could occur between two tribal members on a
reservation that straddles a state border. If the plaintiff is a tribal member residing
on one side of the state border and the defendant lives on the other side of the
border, then there would be diversity of citizenship for purposes of federal
jurisdiction.457 But both states lack the jurisdiction to hear the matter because to do
so would infringe on the tribe's sovereignty.45 8 And since the states cannot
adjudicate the case, neither can the federal court, when the asserted jurisdiction is
based solely on diversity of citizenship.
Another example of where neither the state nor the federal courts have
jurisdiction would be where the plaintiff, who is a tribal member, sues the
defendant, a non-Indian, pursuant to a provision of the tribal code. If the defendant
challenges the validity of the tribal ordinance by filing an action in federal district
court based on diversity, the federal court presumably would not be able to hear the
case. Since there is no federal question in the interpretation of the tribal ordinance,
jurisdiction must be based on diversity. But if the district court's jurisdiction is
based on diversity, then the federal court would lack jurisdiction because the state
could not have heard the underlying case due to the Williams infringement test.459
It should be noted, however, that federal courts clearly have the authority to
hear a defendant's challenge to tribal court jurisdiction because the scope of tribal
jurisdiction is a federal question.!6 But the Supreme Court has not yet decided the
453. Note that, in addition to being tribal members, Indians are citizens of the state in which they reside.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV (providing that anyone born in the United States is a citizen of the state in which he
resides). The Fourteenth Amendment applies to Indians. See Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp.13 (D.
Ariz. 1975), affrd sub nom. Apache County v. United States, 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
454. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
455. Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 992 108-09 (1945).
456. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,222-23 (1959).
457. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
458. Williams, 358 U.S. at 217,222-23.
459. Il
460. But see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987) (holding that federal courts should
refrain from hearing the matter until all tribal remedies have been exhausted).
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issue of what the federal court should do if there is a challenge to the tribal court's
decision on the merits of a case, rather than a jurisdictional challenge. If the losing
party challenges the tribal court's decision on the merits, and the state would not
have had jurisdiction to hear the underlying case, then the federal district court
presumably would not have jurisdiction to re-litigate the underlying dispute.
What makes the diversity of citizenship analysis so crucial is that a plaintiff
may be left without a forum in which to seek relief if the analysis is conducted
properly. As discussed above, this could occur if a federal court determines that the
tribal court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case, and the state and federal courts also
lack subject matter jurisdiction. It can also occur if the tribe lacks a dispute
resolution system that can adjudicate the matter. This creates a very uncomfortable
situation for most courts. The usual response is to find a way to twist the analysis
so that either the state or the federal court can assert jurisdiction. Unfortunately,
while this makes the plaintiff happy, it also creates bad precedent. More than one
district court has completely contorted the jurisdictional discussion in a diversity
situation to avoid leaving the plaintiff with no hope of relief.4 '
Finally, an issue exists regarding whether a party who challenges the
jurisdiction of a tribal court must exhaust tribal remedies prior to filing the
challenge in federal district court. While the Supreme Court has held that federal
district courts should require the challenging party to exhaust all tribal remedies as
a matter of comity, 2 it has not stated that the parties must exhaust the tribal
remedies.
461. See, e.g., RI. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 984 (9th Ci. 1983).
Although the Fort Belknap court held that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving
the interpretation of a tribal ordinance because it would violate the Williams "infringement test," the court's
holding was based on the fact that the tribe was exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The court
stated, "the federal courts sitting in diversity are not divested of jurisdiction when the tribe has not itself
manifested an interest in adjudicating the dispute." Id. at 984; see also Poitra v. Demanias, 502 F.2d 23, 24 (8th
Cir. 1974). Poitra v. Demarrias involved a wrongful death action filed by one tribal member against another based
on an accident that occurred on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, which straddles the border of North Dakota
and South Dakota. The plaintiff lived on the North Dakota side of the border, and the defendant lived on the South
Dakota side. The court of appeals held that the district court hadjurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiff's
wrongful death action was based on a North Dakota statute. Despite the fact that the North Dakota state courts
had explicitly ruled that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such actions occurring on the Standing Rock
Reservation, the court of appeals nonetheless held that the federal courts had jurisdiction for two reasons. First.
the court held that, by not agreeing to state assumption ofjurisdicdon under P.L. 280, the tribe itself created the
jurisdictional gap. Id. at 27. Second, there was no significant state interest implicated in the case. Id. Thus, instead
of examining the tribal interests under the Williams test, the appellate court looked only at the federal and state
interests and blamed the tribe for not ceding its authority to the State.
462. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (federal question);
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (diversity).
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XV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DocRINE
Federal preemption refers to the doctrine holding that federal law displaces
state law where state law conflicts either with the achievement of a federal scheme
in an area of law or where Congress has occupied an entire field of law. The
purpose of the inquiry, then, is to determine whether the tribe, state or federal
government has jurisdiction. If the area of law is "traditionally federal," or if
Congress has a comprehensive regulatory scheme with respect to that area of law,
then federal law will preempt state law. Indian law is clearly "traditionally federal"
because the Constitution reserves to Congress the right to regulate commerce with
the tribes under the "Indian Commerce Clause, ' ' 3 and the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs.4 While the
presumption is usually in favor of states in a preemption analysis in other areas of
law, this is exactly the opposite in federal Indian law. As far back as the 1832
Supreme Court decision in Worcester v. Georgia,4 the Supreme Court recognized
the federal policy of protecting tribal sovereignty against state incursion.
Generally speaking, federal law will displace state law where the issues involve
Indians on Indian land. Where the dispute involves non-Indians and/or non-Indian
land, the presumption of federal preemption is weaker. However, even then, the
analysis must be conducted against the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty. Some
areas that Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized as being preempted by
federal law include wildlife protection laws,467 environmental statutes4 and
taxation involving reservation Indians' and Indian lands.4 70 In setting out the
preemption analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members
must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has
been pre-empted by operation of federal law... Ambiguities in federal
law have been construed generously in order to comport with these
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence. We have thus rejected the proposition
that in order to find a particular state law to have been pre-empted by
operation of federal law, an express congressional statement to that effect
is required....
463. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
464. See, eg., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,192 (1989).
465. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
466. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comr'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
467. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,324 (1983).
468. lit
469. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
470. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
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When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state
law is generally inapplicable.... [But where] a State asserts authority over
the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation .... we
have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in
terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal
independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized
inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise
of state authority would violate federal law. 7'
The focus of the inquiry when non-Indians or non-Indian land is involved, then, is
on congressional intent as expressed in the treaties and statutes and on whether the
state law would conflict with or undermine such intent.
XVI. CONCLUSION
As tribes continue to work for economic and political self-sufficiency, tribal,
state and federal courts will face more complex jurisdictional issues. These issues
will best be resolved with a realization by both the state and federal governments
that the tribes are continuing to evolve and change as sovereign entities. In turn, the
tribes must exercise their sovereign powers fully informed and educated as to the
ramifications of their laws and practices. Tribes should also pay close attention to
the impact that economic development strategies may have on their sovereignty as
a whole. All tribes need to further realize the impact that the lawsuits in which they
are involved may have on tribes throughout the country. With these principles as
a basis, all parties can work toward consistency, predictability and fairness to
litigants while respecting tribal sovereignty.
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471. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracke, 448 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1980) (citations omitted).
